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 V 
Abstract 
One key tool in a rights-based approach to enhancing women‟s participation in governance 
is affirmative action. Enabling women‟s access to and active participation in governance 
institutions through women‟s Facilitating Project is viewed as a means of democratising 
politics in Iran. This process empowers women to claim citizenship rights to equal political 
participation and development, and thereby ensure gender-responsive development 
outcomes. Analysis of Iran‟s implementation of women‟s Facilitating Project in its Islamic 
Local Councils system of decentralised governance in Hamedan and Sistan and 
Baluchistan, however, suggests that affirmative action secures for women political 
representation, but not necessarily political power to transform governance and reshape 
gender relations. Engendering governance instead requires a simultaneous strategy of 
affirmative action coupled with a strong commitment by state and civil society actors to 
addressing the structural inequalities that infringe upon women‟s rights to political 
participation and development. 
 1 
1 Introduction 
The past decade has seen development discourse shift from a developmental state-centered 
approach to one laying increasing emphasis on citizen participation as a means of 
improving political and economic governance. A “New Policy Agenda”, combining neo-
liberal economics and liberal democratic theory, advocates the replacement of the state by 
the market and private sector as the more efficient mechanisms for economic growth. A 
concurrent strategy to generate more responsive and equitable development policies is 
creating efficient and accountable state institutions by encouraging democratic citizen 
participation in public affairs.
1
 Participation by citizens in the social, economic and 
political processes that affect their lives is also increasingly viewed as a vital aspect of 
human development, both a means of achieving human development as well as an end in 
itself.
2
 
 
“Deepening” democracy through citizen participation requires equitable representation of 
all social groups, and especially marginalised groups, in governance. Women‟s right to 
equal political participation thereby gains focus, given the under-representation of women 
in political institutions, their lower human development indicators and marginalised voice 
in development processes in most countries. An international consensus exists that “the 
empowerment and autonomy of women and the improvement of women's social, economic 
and political status is…essential for the achievement of both transparent and accountable 
government and…sustainable development in all areas of life.”3 In this context, rights-
based approaches to development and governance focus on securing civil-political and 
socio-economic rights particularly for marginalised and discriminated social groups, such 
as women. Goal number 3 of the Millennium Development Goals is to “promote gender 
equality and empowerment.”4 The priority given to this goal by the United Nations 
confirms women‟s rights and gender equality as “core values of development.”5 
Empowering women to claim their legal right to participate in decision-making regarding 
                                                 
1
 Edwards and Hulme (1997); Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2004) 
2
 UNDP (1993) 
3
 Beijing Platform of Action (1995) §181 
4
 Cf. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/2 and www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (accessed 10/02/10) 
5
 UNDP (2003) p.2 
 2 
the allocation of resources and development priorities is viewed as a key process through 
which other rights can be realised for both women and the broader community.
6
 
 
In terms of operationalising a rights-based approach to engendering governance, women‟s 
formal representation in politics is seen as an important step towards empowering women 
to realise their right to political their participation. One rights-based tool that immediately 
secures women‟s entry into governance institutions is legal affirmative action policies. The 
premise is that increasing the number of women in political positions will change the 
nature and functioning of male-dominated political institutions. This change in turn should 
encourage more equitable and gender-responsive development policies, thereby bringing 
women from the peripheries of human development to the centre.
7
 Debates, however, 
continue as to whether entrenching women‟s formal political participation through 
“Facilitating” systems is sufficient to generate the “empowered participation” required to 
propel a transformative development process. Structural factors such as prevailing socio-
cultural norms, gendered inequalities in access to resources, information and power, and 
political power configurations all impact on issues of women‟s participation and 
responsiveness in governance. 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of affirmative action policies in enhancing women‟s 
equal participation in governance, the Iranian Islamic Local Councils system of 
decentralised governance with its multiple affirmative action policies such as the 
Facilitating Project for different categories of women is analysed.
8
 Focusing on Islamic 
Local Councils (Shuras) and decentralised governance institutions in the states of Hamedan 
and Sistan and Baluchistan, this study explores the strengths and shortcomings of 
Facilitating Project as a means of securing women‟s right to participation in decentralised 
governance in Iran. Moreover, given the hierarchical structure of Iranian society along 
                                                 
6
 OHCHR (2002) 
7
 Ebadi (2003) 
8
 See more Iranian affirmative action policies in international programmes like UNDP and the Millennium 
Development goals, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Knowledge Network of 
Women in Politics (iKNOW Politics), and the Beijing Process, as well as  national programmes such as: 
Tarh-e Tashilgari (Facilitating  Project) and Jahad- e Sazandegi programmes. 
 3 
caste lines, specific focus is placed on Hazara Baluchs
9
 and Lakis
10
 women‟s participation 
in Islamic Local Councils (Shuras) due to their experience of the double burden of caste 
and gender discrimination. 
 
The main aim of the study is to highlight and discuss to what extent affirmative action in 
decentralised governance in Iran enables women to assert their rights to political 
participation and socio-economic development. Key questions in evaluating the 
implementation of Islamic Local Councils Laws and Facilitating Project for women in 
general, and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women in particular, in Iranian Islamic 
decentralised governance institutions are: 
  
(1) What social, political and other obstacles do women face in accessing their right to   
political participation in Iran? 
(2) Where women enter into Islamic decentralised governance system via “Facilitating    
      Projects” what social, economic, political and other factors affect how women enjoy 
      their right to empowered political participation in practice? 
 (3) Does women‟s representation in the Islamic decentralised governance of Iran transform 
these political institutions, producing more responsive development outputs for 
women and especially women in the Hazara Baluchs and Lakis ethnic groups?  
 
Analysis of the de facto participation by women and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis in Iran 
leads to the conclusion that in order to operationalise a rights-based approach to 
development for women in Iran, further action is required beyond affirmative action 
policies like Facilitating Project. Indications are that both state and civil society actors must 
address the socio-cultural norms and power hierarchies, and human and productive 
resource inequalities that infringe upon women‟s right to equal political participation. It is 
this more holistic development strategy that holds potential for delivering equitable 
                                                 
9 &10 Hazara Baluchs and Lakis denote “Scheduled castes”, the lowest social groups in the ritualised caste 
hierarchy, who face widespread discrimination on the basis of work and descent.   
 
 4 
participation in governance and responsive development policies and programmes for 
women. 
 
1.1 Methodology 
This study is an analysis of women‟s participation in Islamic local governments (Shuras) in 
Iran, and how gender affects women in politics. This study is based on a “bottom-up” 
approach,
11
 and focuses on Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women‟s experience in decentralised 
governance in Iran. Due to constraints on length this paper is limited mainly to the period 
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. This study applies a human rights-based 
approach to women‟s political participation with consideration of international human 
rights instruments concerning gender equality in politics, women‟s empowerment and 
responsiveness. Law and qualitative social science methods are combined in an effort to 
assess whether there has been an improvement in the position of women in Iranian politics 
especially in decentralised governance in Iran. 
 
One of the most important contributions of this research is the use of Persian language 
scholarship on the subject and making it available to English-speaking readers. There has 
been some discussion of the right of women‟s political participation within Iran, most 
notably the study in English by Parvin Paidar entitled “Women and the political process in 
twentieth –century Iran” and in Persian by Zahra Nejad Bahram entitled “Mavan-e 
Mosharekat-e Siyasi Zanan dar Iran” (Obstacles of Women’s Political Participation in 
Iran). However, Paidar‟s book concentrates principally on the lack of the recognition of 
women‟s political participation in Islam and in Islamic Iran, whereas Nejad Bahram 
emphasises the equality among men and women in political participation according to the 
Qur‟an and discusses the social and political obstacles of women‟s participation in politics. 
This study will differ in comparing Iranian Islamic legislation focusing upon Iranian 
Islamic Constitution Law, with the standards of the international human rights conventions 
                                                 
11
 Cf. Dahl 1987 and Bentzon et al 1998. In contrast there is the “top-down approach”, which takes the law as 
starting point when assessing women‟s legal and social status, cf. Bentzon et al 1998 pp.82 and 88. 
 5 
on the issue of the affirmative action and women‟s participation in decentralised 
governance by focusing on the case study of Sistan and Baluchistan and Hamedan.   
 
The main source of women‟s political rights in international law is the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), particularly its 
article 7. Since Iran has not ratified CEDAW, the research will analyse the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and other international human rights instruments as primary sources of 
international law which Iran has ratified. In addition, the Iranian Islamic Constitution Law 
and Islamic Local Councils Law on the political participation and implementation of the 
principle of equality between women and men constitute the national legal framework. The 
study will state the applicable law at the international and national level, and in particular 
see if the Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women‟s right to political participation meets 
international standards. 
 
1.2 Field Work 
To get a realistic picture of the situation and women‟s political participation in 
decentralised governance in Iran and in particular the ethnic women such as Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis, examining rules and regulations is not sufficient. Doing this study is 
strengthen through consulting additional literature and conducting interviews as well. The 
team that conducted the interviews was comprised of three students from the faculty of law 
in Tehran, two researchers and women‟s human rights activists from Fatima Green Home 
Charity and myself. Interviews were conducted with: Gholam Hussein Azami who is 
researcher in ethnic challenges to the nation state in Iran, attorney of law and professor at 
University of Tehran, Ayatollah Safi, Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani, representatives of Iranian 
civil society, previous female Members of Parliament, some female members in both urban 
and rural Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan Councils, their male family members and 
other male members of the Councils. Male Council members were interviewed in order to 
assess their relationship with the women. We interviewed the male family members, 
because it is important to understand how family support is crucial for women‟s ability to 
 6 
participate in politics, especially in a religious society like Iran. The interviews were 
conducted with both the Reformists who support the democratic movements and women‟s 
political participation and the Conservatives who follow the traditional Islamic view of 
women as a wives and mothers. Given the potentially sensitive nature of the discussions, 
some of the interviewees are not identified by name in this study. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This study will focus to what extent affirmative action in decentralised governance in Iran 
enable women to assert their rights to political participation. The thesis is divided into six 
chapters. The introduction gives an overview of the importance of women‟s access to 
active participation in local governments through affirmative action. 
 
The second chapter of this thesis examines rights-based approaches to women‟s 
participation in political decision-making in governance.  In general, this chapter deals with 
participation, empowerment and responsiveness through the affirmative action policies to 
secure women‟s representation. 
 
In the third chapter, I will explore Iran‟s international obligations under international 
human rights law based on women‟s right to political participation as well as the current 
national laws in Iran. It compares the women‟s political participation standards embodied 
in the international treaties ratified by Iran as against the Hazara Baluchs and Lakis cases 
examined in chapters five and six. 
 
Fourthly, I will examine decentralised governance and the Facilitating Project for 
encouraging and empowering women in politics in Iran. This chapter will explore the 
implementation of decentralised governance in two states of Iran, Hamedan and Sistan and 
Baluchistan where the Lakis and Hazara Baluchs ethnic groups live and where women of 
these ethnic groups suffer from a double burden of caste and gender discrimination. 
 
 7 
In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the trends emerging from the Hamedan and Sistan and 
Baluchistan case study. This chapter will examine affirmative action policies and Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis women‟s participation in local government institutions and in 
democratic elections in both states. 
 
The final chapter will evaluate the impact of affirmative action in decentralised governance 
and give some recommendations for engendering governance through rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
2 Rights-based Approaches to Women in Governance and Affirmative Action  
Inclusive democracy is increasingly advocated as intrinsic to strengthening democratic 
values and politics in order to achieve more representative, participatory and accountable 
governance for development.
12
 Governance in this context comprises the „state, market and 
civil society institutions, mechanisms and processes through which citizens articulate their 
interests, exercise their rights and mediate their differences.‟13By focusing on inclusiveness 
and democratic politics, attention is drawn to women as the largest social group excluded 
from participation in governance in most countries. The political economy of gender and 
other interlinking forms of discrimination, such as race or caste entails systemic social, 
economic and political deprivation, as well as devaluation of social identity. Hence, the 
underlying argument in this chapter is that guaranteeing social justice through women‟s 
equal participation in governance is essential in order to expand women‟s substantive 
freedoms or capabilities in terms of resources and agency “to lead lives that they have 
reason to value.” 14 
One of the main objectives of this chapter is that a gender equality in politics is not only the 
issue of quantity, but also quality, if one wants to see any effects resulting from a balanced 
participation of women and men in decision-making. Hence, a number of issues may be 
raised in this regard. For instance, to what extent affirmative action policies secure 
women‟s political participation and the accountability of elected representatives towards 
the citizens. Is there a need for special measures for women‟s representation that must be 
implemented in accordance with the political accountability principle? It is obvious that 
without accountability for political representatives women are less likely to be empowered 
by affirmative action and different systems like the Facilitating Project. The frame of this 
chapter is based on the three principles of gender participation, women‟s political 
empowerment and responsiveness. 
 
                                                 
12
 UNDP (2000) 
13
 UNDP (1997) p.9 
14
 Sen (1999) p.85 
 9 
2.1 Women in Governance  
The gendered nature of governance institutions is characterised not only by male-
dominated social and political positions of power, but also by institutional characteristics 
such as policies that disproportionately distribute development outputs to men.
15
 In only the 
most advanced countries, i.e. Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and 
Netherlands, do women occupy over one-third of national parliamentary seats, and women 
consistently record lower literacy and income levels as compared to men.
16
 Political 
Science Studies
17
 have revealed that the one-third critical mass of women in political 
decision-making has not led to a consequent spread of gender equality into all spheres of 
society. There are significant areas of concern as regards equality between women and men 
in the Nordic countries, such as family, education and work. In developing countries like 
Iran, India, Pakistan, wealthy and educated women occupied some high-level positions in 
politics.
18
 The debilitating impact of gender disparities in governance and development 
indicates a gap in women‟s control over decision-making processes that provide 
opportunities for development. The focus of governance discourse on public institutions, 
arguably reinforces the public-private divide that forms the core of gender power 
structures; that is it supports a socio-political construction that distinguishes and prioritises 
(male) activities in the public sphere, while de-emphasising governance in the private 
sphere where women are primarily located.
19
  
 
Engendering governance institutions, therefore, involves examining the process of 
women‟s participation, as well as the achievement of gender-equitable policy outcomes. 
Attention is placed on the legal and political processes that enable participation as well as 
the informal social institutions that circumscribe the „legitimate‟ behaviour of women in 
the public sphere. The category of women is also disaggregated further in order to examine 
the extent to which promoting women‟s participation in governance entrenches or 
                                                 
15
 Sedghi (2007) pp.155-158 
16
 UNDP (2004) 
17
 Dahlerup (1988) pp.275-298  
18
 Farmayan (1971) p.105 
19
 Hajiloo (2008) pp.113-138 
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transforms interlinking biases such as race, caste or class.
20
 Engendering governance 
further aims to produce policy outputs that will guarantee women‟s rights in both the public 
and private spheres, thereby collapsing this distinction in terms of women‟s right to 
development.
21
 An underlying assumption is that women‟s participation in governance 
should foster a „civic republican notion of citizenship‟, where citizenship is participatory 
and pursues the common good.
22
   
 
The challenge is to create an enabling environment in which women have the freedom and 
equal opportunity to contest and be elected to political institutions, and to participate in 
political decision-making and access development resources. One approach that has gained 
wide acceptance as an effective means of creating this enabling environment is a rights-
based approach, which bases women‟s struggle for social justice and equal voice in 
political decision-making in their claims to formal rights. A human rights discourse is 
increasingly perceived to provide a framework for participation in decision-making aimed 
at facilitating a more inclusive and democratic process for women.
23
 The slogan “half of 
the world-half of the power” of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 
conveyed the need for a balanced representation of women and men in political decision-
making. It encompasses the firm conviction that without the active participation of women 
and incorporation of women‟s perspectives at all levels of decision-making, no issue can be 
solved in a manner which is satisfactory, just and equitable for society in its entirety.
24
 So, 
if women and men do not work together on an equal basis, sharing equal rights, we shall be 
left with “half-baked” societies and incomplete democracies.25  
 
                                                 
20
 Supra note 19 
21
 Ebadi, 1993 
22
 Lister (1997), quoted in Akhavi (2000) pp.63-65 and p. 97; and Farncoise Gaspard and Claude Servan-
Schreiber argue that women have different political interests to men and that these interests are not being 
adequately represented by male-dominated Parliament, in De La fraternite a la parite, Le Monde, 19 
fevrier1993. Also see: evidences such as National Policy on Ethiopian Women in 1993, National Policy for 
the Employment of Women in India in 2001, White Revolution Referendum in Iran in 1963 that emphasise 
women‟s participation in governance with a concern to gender -sensitive and women friendly policies and 
outcomes.  
23
 See Molyneux and Razavi (2002), Nussbaum (2000) 
24
 UNFWCW Platform for action, G. Women in Power and decision-making,§181 
25
 Vigdis Finnbogadottir, President of Iceland , in Conference ”Equality and Democracy” (1995) 
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2.2 Right to Political Participation – Equity, Social Justice and Development 
“A rights-based approach to development sets the achievement of human rights as an 
objective of development.”26 The value added by a rights-based approach is the normative 
character and structural protection deriving from the legal foundation of rights. This is 
crucial for demanding accountability for respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights. 
Exercising human agency by claiming rights as entitlements, and identifying and holding 
accountable policy-makers and other actors duty-bound to fulfill rights, form the basis of 
negotiating equal access to development resources and power. In the process of 
encouraging positive structural change, attention is specifically drawn to addressing the 
social subordination, exclusion and voicelessness endured by groups such as women. 
Women‟s equal participation in decision-making is not only a demand for simple justice or 
democracy but can also be seen as a necessary condition for women‟s interests to be taken 
into account. Without the actives participation of women and the incorporation of women‟s 
perspective at all levels of decision-making, the goals of equality and development cannot 
be achieved.  Hence, rights-based interventions are designed, to establish the principle of 
equality and the non-negotiable benchmark of the elimination of discrimination that limits 
women‟s ability to exercise choice in their lives.27 
      
Translated into the arena of gender and governance, a rights-based approach involves a 
participatory and political process that aims to empower women and encourage their more 
active citizenship. Rights-based approaches provide support for women‟s participation in 
governance by positing political participation as an entitlement. The corresponding state 
obligation is to ensure the right to political participation without discrimination,
28
 by 
making appropriate social, economic and political arrangements that promote women‟s 
access to information, political voice and development opportunities.
29
 This implies 
attention to both the legal processes that seek to guarantee rights, and the social, economic 
and political processes embodied in formal and informal mechanisms that entrench gender 
                                                 
26
 ODI (1999) p.1 
27
 Hamm (2001). Also see Human Rights, Plural Legalities and Gendered Realities (2007) pp.316-334 
28
 As per CEDAW art 7    
29
 Supra note 10 
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discrimination and pose hurdles to the enjoyment of equal rights in governance and 
development.
30
 Rights must be strategically claimed in such a manner as to prompt state 
intervention to create this enabling environment for women‟s political participation as a 
means of maintaining state legitimacy and power. 
 
2.3 Securing Women’s Representation through Affirmative Action  
Given that equal citizenship rights do not guarantee disadvantaged women equality of 
opportunity, agency and outcome in political decision-making, the rights-based tool of 
affirmative action
31
 forms a corrective strategy to rapidly equalise women‟s representation 
in governance institutions. For women as a group to exercise agency and voice and 
transform policies in male-dominated governance institutions, it is generally recognised 
that a “critical mass” of at least one-third women in governance structures is essential.32 
The duty of the state to adopt appropriate measures fulfilling women‟s right to equal 
political participation, therefore, justifies the use of affirmative action quotas or similar 
measures to establish that critical mass. 
 
Affirmative action like reserved quotas or Facilitating Project for women in governance 
redefine women‟s engagement with the state by shifting social justice concerns from law to 
politics. Affirmative action carries with it ideas of substantive equality in the interests of 
fairness to women, increasing overall social welfare by reducing gender disparities, and the 
idea of reparations for accumulated gender disabilities.
33
 The challenge lies in utilising the 
opportunity offered by special measures of affirmative action in governance institutions to 
change the gender-inequitable structuring of power and resources.
34
 
 
                                                 
30
 Ensor and Gready (2005) 
31
 CEDAW art 4(1) allows the adoption of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality 
between women and men.   
32
 Hamadeh-Banerjee (2000) 
33
 Golzar (1990)  
34
 Khalili (2007).  He argues that affirmative action will really make difference when political parties decide 
to give thirty three percent or more of their seats to women candidates.   
 13 
Protagonists of affirmative action claim it is a “transformative remedy” that raises women‟s 
political awareness, legitimises their role and voice in the public sphere, as well as disrupts 
and ultimately restructures gender relations. By contrast, its detractors cite affirmative 
action as an “affirmative remedy” that merely corrects inequitable outcomes without 
disturbing underlying social structures that perpetuate women‟s disempowerment.35 
Affirmative action policies are debated due to their ambiguous consequences for achieving 
substantive equality for marginalised social groups. Ensuring women‟s election to reserved 
political seats in the absence of social and political pressures, social alienation or coercive 
patriarchal patronage relationships is difficult. Moreover, legally created spaces enabling 
women‟s formal political representation may not be enough to ensure their equitable and 
free participation in the absence of concurrent attempts to equalise social and economic 
bases of power. 
36
 
  
What needs to be examined, therefore, is the way in which increased women‟s political 
participation through affirmative action policies affects and is affected by existing unequal 
social, economic and political power structures mobilizing around the election and 
participation of women in governance. A second consideration is the extent to which 
guaranteeing formal participation through affirmative action leads to women‟s 
empowerment in terms of increasing their agency and voice in decision-making processes. 
A third consideration is how women representatives are then able to utilise the political 
space that special measures on the affirmative action shelf provide, to generate more 
gender-responsive policy outcomes. 
2.3.1 Participation  
Women‟s right to actively participate in political life signifies more than just a means by 
which good governance is achieved; it is also a bottom-up process by which other 
citizenship rights can be claimed and fulfilled, and accountability demanded from state and 
                                                 
35
 Fraser (1997), quoted in Kabeer (2000) p.95 
36
 Ghaeb (2008) 
 14 
society actors to ensure women‟s equal political voice and development.37 Participatory 
decision-making is also an end in itself, a form of empowerment ensuring that “people have 
the right to determine their path for development.” 38 
 
Participation, however, has to be examined from the perspective of not only who 
participates, but also their level of participation. It is the latter aspect which directs 
attention to the existing socio-political power sharing configurations present in political 
spaces opened for women‟s participation.39 Participation, therefore, spans a wide range of 
forms promoting differing interests and functions: “instrumental participation” posits 
participation as means to more efficient and cost-effective development decisions; 
“representative participation” aims at greater voice and leverage in decision-making in 
order to promote sustainable outcomes; and at the highest level “transformative 
participation” focuses on empowerment and views participation as both a means and end. 40  
 
Women‟s transformative participation in governance cannot be isolated from addressing 
their devalued social identity, disentitlement to social and material resources and power and 
pervasive gender discriminatory norms, power structures and discourse that inform and are 
produced by political institutions.
41
 Women often lack assets such as education, social 
capital, information networks and control over productive resources that are inputs into 
substantive political participation. Unequal participation in decision-making in the private 
sphere often replicates itself in a lack of familial and community support for women‟s 
freedom of voice in the public sphere.
42
 Moreover, social inequalities transposed into state 
laws and policies unequally distribute resource entitlements to women. Given these factors, 
women‟s relative powerlessness translates into their low perception of options for change 
                                                 
37
 Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2004) 
38
 Hamm (2001) p.1019 
39
 Cornwall (2002) 
40
 White (1996) p.7. A study shows in Iran, women belong to ethnic and religious minorities groups such as 
Bahai‟s, Mandaeans, Tats, Kulis have no political participation and no voice within a representative 
democracy (interview with Azami, 2010)  
41
 Gaventa (2002) 
42
 Supra note 32 
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and thereby failure to articulate their gender interests and needs in public decision-making 
fora.
43
  
 
Affirmative action in this context is a blunt instrument of formal power redistribution that 
can potentially lead to a violent backlash against elected women representatives. Large-
scale quotas or other similar measures can also result in the election of inadequately 
qualified women representatives, while discrediting competent women representatives who 
enter politics through special measures rather than on their own merit.
44
 A lack of social 
and political commitment to increasing representation for women is often manifested in 
affirmative action operating as a ceiling on women‟s political representation, or in the 
ability of the dominant male elite and political parties to circumvent special measures by 
co-opting pliable women candidates for such positions. Affirmative action, therefore, can 
enable greater participation in terms of numbers, but not necessarily greater voice or 
substantive participation in governance.
45
 
 
Increasing political participation through affirmative action policies is particularly 
problematic for such a diverse social group as women, where interlinking race, caste, class 
and other inequalities transect gender to override citizenship rights guaranteed by the state 
and deny equal recognition to women.
46
 Reserved quotas can often translate into more 
privileged women or relatives of male political actors capturing most positions, thereby 
effectively preserving the inequitable social status quo. In the absence of quotas, however, 
it is arguable that the same outcome would be produced. Hence, at least a greater 
opportunity is offered for more socio-economically deprived women to benefit via 
affirmative action.
47
  
 
A further critique of affirmative action policies is that the resulting over-emphasis on 
gendered identities as a means to women‟s empowerment and accessing political “benefits” 
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is gaining precedence over the wider notion of equal citizen rights, regardless of gender, as 
a means for common social progress.
48
 Other critics regard affirmative action policies as 
negating women‟s equality by “isolat[ing] women from the mainstream social and political 
life and relegat[ing] them to the protective custody of the government.”49 This effectively 
absolves other social actors from responsibility for ensuring gender-equitable political 
participation. These criticisms have led some to argue that greater political gains for 
socially marginalised groups lie not solely in affirmative action policies such as reserved 
quotas, but in prompting political competition at the local level that organises these social 
groups and enables them to voice their development needs. 
50
 
 
2.3.2 Empowerment  
The empowerment and autonomy of women and the improvement of women‟s social, 
economic and political status is essential for the achievement of both transparent and 
account able government, administration and sustainable development in all areas of life.
51
 
Empowerment involves the expansion of women‟s capabilities and ability to exercise 
choice, power and leadership in governance.
52
 This process of facilitating critical 
consciousness and building capacities aims to propel women to assert their autonomy by 
expanding political spaces and redefining institutional practices and power relations. 
Women‟s participation in governance thereby becomes a site for negotiation over claims to 
women‟s unfulfilled citizenship rights.53 These claims encompass “the politics of 
redistribution (egalitarianism) as well as of recognition (respect for diversity).”54  
 
A focus on empowerment places women‟s interests and development needs at the centre, 
addressing power imbalances in both the public and private spheres. Empowerment 
emphasizes transforming power from a zero-sum relationship of control or “power over” 
                                                 
48
 Shojai (2003) 
49
 Buch (2000) p.37 
50
 Manor (2002) 
51
 See supra note 3  
52
 Mitchell (1996) 
53
 VeneKlasen et al (2004) 
54
 Kabeer (2000) p.86  
 17 
exercised by dominant social actors over women. Instead, power in relation to women‟s 
agency is exercised in more positive, enabling ways: as “power to”, uncovering the 
potential of every woman to shape her life; and as “power within”, realising women‟s self-
worth and capacities. At a more tangible level, “power with”, or associational activity, 
organising and engaging in collaborative action with others, is imperative in order to 
successfully challenge gender hierarchies and engender governance and development at the 
broader collective level.
55
 
 
Countering arguments against affirmative action, some researchers point to reserved quotas 
in gendered societies as a key element in empowerment, offering the potential over time for 
women to gain the necessary political skills and self-confidence with which to challenge 
inequitable socio-economic and political power relations. When entrenched as a legal right, 
affirmative action provides a legal mechanism for women to demand state intervention to 
secure their rights to political participation and more responsive policies. Importantly, 
affirmative action has potential to catalyse social change by offering opportunities for 
women to “mobilise around rights issues.”56  
 
The inherent danger in rapidly equalising women‟s political representation without a 
correspondingly rapid process of women‟s empowerment lies in creating a situation where 
dominant social forces can easily utilise the political spaces opened up to women to 
reinforce, rather than transform, social, economic and political power relations.
57
 This 
emphasises the responsibility of both state and civil society actors to not only encourage 
women‟s entry into governance institutions, but also to ensure that empowering women 
through education and training to claim their right to political participation involves 
examining and addressing the systemic causes and consequences of their marginalisation.
58
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2.3.3 Responsiveness  
Responsiveness, that is, how women representatives in governance institutions represent 
the interests of their constituency, is the envisaged outcome of translating the political 
authority gained through affirmative action into women‟s equal and empowered political 
participation. Women‟s empowered participation in governance should ostensibly lead to 
gender equity in terms of the choices women have and the more accountable, gender 
responsive policy decisions they make.
59
 
 
The responsiveness of women representatives to both “practical and strategic gender 
needs”60 in governance can be discerned at three levels: at the level of positive policy 
outcomes for individual women; at the level of changing institutional rules and resource 
allocations in favour of women; and at the highest level of restructuring gender, race, caste 
and other social relations.
61
 While a rights-based approach including affirmative action can 
lead to attainment of the first two levels of responsiveness, the direct link between this 
approach and effecting systemic changes is less clear. Increasing women‟s representation 
in governance via affirmative action may contribute to enhancing the process of political 
learning and the actual political capabilities and voice of women. Women‟s representation, 
however, does not guarantee that the institutional power and resources acquired by women 
elected representatives will be translated into qualitatively better representation of women‟s 
interests.
62
  
 
 Research suggests that participatory and rights-oriented approaches tend to produce more 
gender-responsive outcomes where certain enabling factors exist, including a reform-
oriented state that is committed to equitable development and social justice and challenges 
inequitable local socio-economic power structures. Complementing legal affirmative action 
to facilitate the entry of a “critical mass” of women into political institutions, supportive 
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capacitating policies have to ensure women‟s empowered participation in order to 
transform policy decision-making. In addition, women entering political institutions should 
be encouraged to establish and maintain their links to progressive social movements, in 
order for both internal and external pressures to be applied to ensure responsive 
development policies and accountable, democratic governance.
63
 
 
The effectiveness of affirmative action as a tool in a rights-based approach to engendering 
governance, therefore, depends on how the interlinking factors of participation, 
empowerment and responsiveness are shaped by and are able to shape existing inequitable 
social, economic and political structures. Ultimately, transforming governance by 
restructuring gender relations holds the key to producing and sustaining gender equity. In 
this regard, the Iranian experience of the Facilitating Project for women in Islamic local 
institutions of decentralised governance is often cited as offering some positive indications 
of a slow but potentially positive process towards women‟s empowered participation in 
political life. Examining the impact of the Facilitating Project that have generated 
thousands of Iranian women elected representatives, indicates the extent to which 
responsibility for women‟s empowered participation in governance and gender-responsive 
policy outcomes can rest on affirmative action. 
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3 Iran, Iran’s human rights obligations and women 
In order to understand women‟s right to political participation in Islamic Iran, we need to 
locate women in the concentric rings of religion, caste, class and society. It is undeniable 
that norms within particular economic, social and cultural conditions influence women and 
their political rights. The Islamic government in Iran believes that everyone is equal 
according to Islam. However, to explore the equality principle for all, a critical question 
must be asked: Why despite an Islamic Revolution in Iran which emphasises equality, are 
there still groups who are discriminated on the basis of their ethnic origin and why do 
women from these groups experience double discrimination?
64
  
  
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the Islamic Republic of Iran‟s obligations under 
international human rights conventions that Iran has ratified, with regard to women‟s right 
to political participation. This chapter outlines a brief overview of Iran‟s governance 
system and ethnicity in various provinces. Later, it will compare the human rights standards 
embodied in the international treaties with Islamic rules and values.  
 
3.1 A brief overview of Iran  
Iran is a big country with a variety of ethnic and multicultural groups who live in different 
parts of Iran. Ethnicity within Iran is mainly determined culturally, although religion, 
language, caste and class are the other factors responsible for ethnic identity.
65
 The so-
called “Persians” are viewed as the dominant majority (nearly 85 percent of the population 
of Iran) but they are not a unified and homogeneous entity. Moreover, they occupy only 20 
to 30 percent of the total area of Iran. The theocratic nature of Iran‟s polity based on the 
supremacy of Shi‟a Islam relegates religious and ethnic minorities such as Sunni Muslim to 
an inferior position. Additionally, the existing inequalities in terms of economic, education 
and cultural parameters in various regions of Iran causes marginalized groups who suffer 
socio-economic “backwardness.”66  
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Iran‟s current political system67 is based on the 1979 constitution, which was passed by a 
popular vote referendum after the Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini transformed 
Iran from a constitutional monarchy to a theocratic republic that intricately links Shari‟a, or 
Islamic law, to constitutional law with elected and appointed leaders. Power is largely 
consolidated within a few governing bodies. The Supreme leader (Iran‟s highest ranking 
political, military and religious authority) President and Guardian Council (an appointed 
body of law specialists and clerics) have the ability to veto any legislation if they interpret 
the law as being incompatible with the constitution or Shari‟a. Iran‟s parliament, the 
Majlis, is unicameral and consists of 290 members elected to four-year terms. The 
parliament sessions are open to the public and broadcasting. Although the parliament 
cannot be dissolved, the Guardian Council has the ability to veto any legislation. Local 
government is administrated by the Ministry of Interior‟s appointed provincial governor-
general and elected city councils.
68
 Local councils together with the parliament are the 
“decision-making and administrative organ of the state.”69  
 
3.2 Iran’s International Obligations under International Human Rights Law - 
Women’s Right to Political Participation  
The rights of women are protected by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and several international covenants, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1979). These Covenants, which are legally binding upon the ratifying 
states, represent the main international legal standards and instruments concerning the 
rights of women. The Islamic Republic of Iran ratified both the 1966 human rights 
covenants of 1966 in 1975, but not the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. Also, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
(1990), endorsed by the foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conferences 
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(OIC) including Iran,
70
 has provisions of relevance to women. Although this declaration is 
not a legally binding treaty, it is a common declaration from the Muslim world on the 
concept and content of human rights. 
  
The principle of equality of all human beings and their enjoyment of the fundamental rights 
without any discrimination on the “grounds of race, colour, gender, language, religion, 
political beliefs, nationality, social status, wealth, birth, or any other situations”71 is 
recognised in international law. The preamble of the UDHR reaffirms the faith in equal 
rights of men and women and recognised that “all human beings are … equal in dignity and 
rights.”72  
 
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) include 
references to equality in their preambles and include general non-discrimination clauses.
73
 
In addition, the ICCPR and the ICESCR each include in their articles 3 a specific clause, 
according to which the state parties of the Covenants “… undertake to ensure the equal 
rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the 
covenant.”74 The first world conference on human rights was organised in Tehran in 1968, 
a few years after the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR. The proclamation of Tehran, the 
Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, states in Art.1 that “it is 
imperative that the members of the international community fulfill their solemn obligations 
to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinions.”75 A resolution however was passed during the Tehran conference 
recommending guidelines for a long-term UN program for the advancement of women.
76
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The later Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) was approved during the time of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). It 
represents the common global achievements concerning rights of women. It recalls that the 
discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for 
human dignity, and is an obstacle to women participating on equal terms with men. The 
ratifying states agree to embody the principle of equality of men and women in their 
national constitutions or in other appropriate legislation, and to establish the legal 
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men.
77
 However, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has not ratified this Convention.
78
 Instead, the government has maintained 
its own policy concerning the rights and status of women in the Islamic Constitution. The 
Constitution emphasises the equality of men and women while requiring the observance of 
Islamic values and principles. Based on the Iranian Constitution, citizens of Iran from all 
cultural and ethnic backgrounds and regardless of their gender are entitled to all individual, 
economic, political, social and cultural rights in criteria with Islamic principles.
79
 Further, 
Article 21 of the Constitution stipulates that the government shall guarantee women‟s 
rights in all respects and create a favourable atmosphere for resorting their material and 
spritual rights. 
 
The most important resource for Islamic values and principles is the Holy Book  
Qur‟an. All are equal in the eyes of God regardless of race, gender, colour and 
religion. No one has a claim to superiority over another, and there is no 
recognition in Islam of a law class, a caste system, a superior race of a chosen 
people and so on. The only ground of superiority recognised in the Qur‟an is 
Taqwa (God-consciousness).
80
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Equality in the essence of humanity necessitates equality in human rights, including the 
right to justice and accountability in government. The Qur‟an expressly states that the locus 
of political authority in Islam is the community of believers, the umma, and government is 
designated into office through the people‟s pledge of allegiance (bay’a) and the 
participation of believers (no differences between men and women) in consultation 
(Shura).
81
 Hence, there is no difference between men and women in political participation. 
The Qur‟an also states that the most successful woman in political authority was the Queen 
of Sheba and her wise Governance.
82
 The Queen of Sheba, who had south Yemen as her 
domain, would overrule her male counsellors and act according to her own will. When her 
kingdom was about to be attacked by Solomon‟s forces, she consulted them. The Qur‟an 
says:  
She (the Queen of Sheba) said, O chiefs, advise me respecting my affair: I never 
decide an affair until you are in my presence. They said, we are possessors of 
strength and possessors of, mighty powers. And the command is thine, so consider 
what thou wilt command. She said surely, the Kings, when they enter a town, ruin it 
and make the noblest of its people to be low; and thus they do. And surely I am 
going to send them a present, and to see what (answer) the messengers bring 
back.”83   
 
Thus, it is quite clear from the above Qur‟anic verses that the Queen of Sheba was a 
legitimate ruler; she has also been shown to be very wise in consultation with male 
counsellors. The Qur‟an has also given emphasis on “believing women” who come to the 
Prophet Muhammad
84
 to pledge themselves to serve no other god besides Allah.
85
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The Islamic Republic of Iran has approved Article 6(A) of the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam, stating that, “woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has rights to 
enjoy as well as duties to perform.” This provision establishes the principle of equality 
between women and men in terms of human dignity. Article 6(A) may be interpreted to 
mean that, women and men, despite equality in human dignity, enjoy different human 
rights: women enjoy special rights due to their sex rather than equal rights like men. This 
view seems to be prevalent among the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
86
 The 
Cairo Declaration also emphasises women‟s right to participation in lawmaking.87 
Moreover, the Cairo conference recognised men, the construction of masculinities and the 
promotion of the partnership between men and women as at the core of gender equality 
debates. It is only the Cairo programme which directly addressed the role of men and male 
responsibilities in promoting gender equality. At the same time, the programme is still  
framed in the language of men‟s power and dominate position in politics.88 
 
Women‟s political participation and their presence in power and decision making is one of 
the most important and critical areas of concern in the implementation of the Beijing 
Platform for Action. Iran‟s Participation in the Beijing process has inspired many 
initiatives, such as establishing the Center for Women's Participation and the membership 
of its Head in the Cabinet, appointing a woman as an adviser to the President and measures 
to empower women in political participation, at the local levels especially. 
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4 Iran, Decentralised Governance and Women 
Iran presents one of the most significant case studies of affirmative action in the 
world. The Iranian state entrenched affirmative action as a constitutional right in 
recognition that legal guarantees of equality of opportunity in a hierarchical caste-
based society are insufficient for inclusive nation-building that ensures the 
participation of marginalised social groups as equal citizens. Affirmative action 
further aimed to prevent the culturally diverse Iranian state from acquiring an ethno-
majoritarian character.
89
 Acknowledging the systemic and intergenerational 
deprivations that socially marginalised groups such as Hazara Baluchs and Lakis 
suffer, “historic reparations” have been delivered through an affirmative action policy 
aimed at “redistribution, integration and representation.”90 
 An examination of the background of Iran‟s reservation policy indicates the highly 
politicised nature of affirmative action. Originally this policy targeted “Scheduled Castes”91 
and “Scheduled Tribes”92 through affirmative action in education, government services and 
parliament. However, socio-political aggregation along caste lines among the backward 
castes
93
 in the 1980s-1990s pressurised political parties into more re-distributive 
development policies.  
One sphere of operation for Iran‟s multiple affirmative action since 1996 is decentralised 
governance or “Islamic Local Councils” and women‟s cooperation in development. 
Drawing women‟s participation in development requires proper strategies in order to 
inspire feasibility, mobility, empowering and a spirit of self-respect. One of these strategies 
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in Iran is the “Facilitating Project” that focuses in increasing women‟s participation in 
various economic, political and social fields.
94
 The participation of women in politics 
legitimised the state‟s Islamic policies and created an image of popular support and 
stability internally and internationally. Ayatollah Khomeini considered women‟s 
participation in the anti-Shah Revolution crucial and on many occasions praised the “lion-
heart women whose great effort saved Islam from the captivity of the foreigners [and] who 
alongside men secured the victory of Islam.”95 Paidar expresses that Ayatollah Khomeini‟s 
support of women was also channeled into strengthening the democratic institutions of the 
Islamic Republic‟s Constitution and women‟s electoral participation was considered of 
prime importance to the populist image of Islamic Iran. Later, women‟s electoral 
participation played an important role in shifting the balance of power in favour of reform 
and change.
96
  
Given the politics surrounding “Facilitating Projects”, the introduction of separate women‟s 
cooperation in Islamic Local Councils (Shuras) and decentralised governance institutions in 
thirty states,
97
 questions are raised of whether this formal representation mandate can 
counter inequitable informal structures that organise local political participation based on 
gender, caste and class.
98
 A further issue is whether Iranian women can be seen as a 
separate category when their social status, socio-economic and political power are 
interlinked with their caste and class. This is highlighted by the severe deprivations Hazara 
Baluchs in Sistan and Baluchistan and Lakis women in Hamedan face due to their social 
positioning at the bottom of Iranian‟s caste, class and gender hierarchies.99 Moreover, a 
broad set of issues have to be negotiated by women elected representatives when exercising 
their right to participation in decentralised governance, which frame the discussion herein. 
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4.1 Decentralised Governance and Women – Broad Issues 
The participatory governance agenda promotes democratic decentralisation as a central 
strategy in producing inclusive, accountable and responsive political institutions and more 
flexible, cost- and time-efficient development policies and programmes. A new political 
contract advocating citizen partnership with the state seeks to transform state legitimacy by 
opening up spaces for citizen participation and people-centered development.
100
 
Institutionalised participation of socially marginalised groups such as women at the local 
level is considered the best means of ensuring equal political participation and more 
targeted development interventions benefiting these groups, as well as entrenching the rule 
of law locally.
101
 
 
Local governance institutions are judged more likely to encourage women‟s participation 
due to their direct role in delivering public services and development programmes that 
“address the interface between [women‟s] public and private roles.”102 Moreover, local 
institutions are the most accessible political space for women, given their current 
reproductive and productive responsibilities within and outside the household and socially 
circumscribed freedom of movement in the public sphere. The spatial proximity of these 
institutions enables women to build political skills, motivation and experience in political 
decision-making, which might precipitate the expansion of their decision-making power in 
the private sphere. Exercising women‟s voice in local government is also said to be easier 
than at higher political levels, where factors such as party interests, prior political 
knowledge and political connections circumscribe women‟s political participation.103 
 
The potential of decentralised governance institutions to secure women‟s participation and 
gender-equitable development outcomes, however, depends to a great extent on 
institutional autonomy and strong accountability mechanisms. Devolution of functions and 
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decision-making powers over local development programmes, funds and administrative 
functionaries, and adequate democratic institutional procedures are essential.
104
 In addition, 
functioning mechanisms that ensure downward accountability of elected representatives to 
their local electorate must be created. Citizen participation through elections and local 
meetings strengthens transparency and accountability in local governance by providing a 
countervailing sanctioning power that should reduce corruption.
105
 Participation and voice 
are also seen as crucial to increasing information exchanges between the state and society 
in order to enhance the quality, quantity and sustainability of development programmes.
106
 
 
Studies further indicate that democratic contestation for power between national, regional 
and local levels can produce more gender-equitable policy outcomes where political parties 
derive their legitimacy or power base from their ability to support women‟s needs.107 An 
active civil society can further aid women in accessing and participating in decentralised 
governance.
108
 A serious hurdle, however, is the likelihood of local (male) elite capture of 
decentralised institutions. The „paradox of participation‟ is that local social and economic 
power structures, patronage networks and patriarchal norms often replicate themselves in 
local governance institutions to the detriment of effective, free political participation of 
women.
109
 This paradox suggests that while wider programmes of state-sponsored social 
and economic reforms are not deemed essential to decentralised governance, they may 
address the afore-mentioned concerns and generate more gender-equitable development 
outcomes.
110
 
 
4.2 Overview of Decentralised Governance in Iran 
Community-based management of local affairs has been a common feature throughout 
Iran‟s history, and the post-Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 saw a constitutional 
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provision directing state governments to set up local governance institutions at the village 
levels. The Constitutional amendment of 1931 provided for municipal elections. Articles 90 
to 93 of the previous Constitution called for the establishment of the elected local 
associations (Anjomanha-ye Ayalati va Velayati). These constitutional provisions gave 
local bodies wide supervisory powers in running public affairs and introducing social 
improvements and reforms. Later, Mohammad Reza Shah gave women the right to vote 
and to be elected .As a result, women‟s participation as a voters and representatives in local 
councils emerged in Iran. 
 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran contains many provisions for public 
participation through popularly-elected local councils. Islam accords high priority to 
consultation, particularly in terms of involving communities in running their own affairs. 
Despite the centralising tendencies of the Islamic Iranian state as regards governance and 
development planning, by the late 1990s most Iranian states had established local 
governments. The tokenistic recommendation by President Mohammad Khatami
111
 in 1999 
that two women interested in working with women and children be co-opted into each local 
government was followed in most states.
112
 
 
Irregular elections, the reluctance of both the central and state government political elite to 
effectively devolve powers, and the Iran-Iraq war, however, made the decentralised 
governance apparent development agents of the state bureaucracy rather than self-
governing institutions for local development. Noting this situation, President Khatami 
advocated greater political autonomy for local governments via their constitutional 
entrenchment as political and not merely developmental institutions. Successful local 
institutions in the states of Tehran and Hamedan in the 1990s strengthened progress 
                                                 
111
 President Khatami appointed women to the cabinet rank for the first time since the founding of the Islamic 
Republic. Masumeh Ebtekar appointed as the first female vice-president for environmental protection and 
women‟s issues, and Azam Nouri as Deputy Minister of Cultural and Islamic Guidance. He also appointed 
Zahra Shojai to serve as presidential Advisor in the Foreign Ministry‟s Department for Women and Social 
Affairs.  President Mahmood Ahmadi Nejad appointed two women ministers in 2010. 
112
 Afary (2009) 
 31 
towards greater political powers for local governments‟ bodies.113 Meanwhile, the Center 
for Women‟s Participation alongside Committees on the Status of Women in 1999 
advocated wider women‟s representation in all local governments‟ bodies.114 
 
Legal provisions for elected local government institutions have existed in the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979, but it was only in 1999, twenty years after the 
Islamic Revolution that this constitutional requirement was put into effect. Chehabi 
observed: "This neglect vitiates our understanding of contemporary Iran, as it is at the local 
level that state policies are carried out, contested, reshaped, resisted, or revised."
115
 
Although the exact term of “decentralisation” was not mentioned in the Constitution text, 
the issue of shaping Islamic village and city councils (as implications of decentralisation) 
has been noted in different articles. Clause 8 of Article 3 of the Constitution obligates the 
government to provide for the “participation of all the people in determining their political, 
social, and cultural destiny."
116
 Article 7 further declares participation in the decision 
making processes of the administration of the country as one of the most essential 
conditions for establishing a participatory system and identifies various types of 
consultative councils, such as City, Region, District and Village Council, as decision-
making organs.
117
 Article 7 is in accordance with the Qur‟an contained in the verse (“Their 
affairs are by consultations among them”) 118and (“Consult them in affairs”).119 
 
Subsequently in 1982, Parliament approved the Islamic Local Councils Law. The 
mentioned law was revised several times between 1982 and 1996, when the final version is 
more applicable as the basis for the recent elections to the local councils. The
 
Islamic 
Constitution and the Islamic Local Council law create a three-tier system of decentralised 
governance, moving Iran towards “cooperative federalism”120 and “significantly widening 
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the democratic base of the Iranian polity.”121 Mandatory measures to establish Islamic 
councils of self-government include conferring authority to prepare plans for economic 
development and social justice in thirty political, social and economic areas under the 
above mentioned laws. Democratic elections are to be held every four years for all Islamic 
Councils members, while indirect elections apply for chairperson positions at the 
intermediate and district levels. The establishment of a State Finance Commission and 
State Election Commission serve to promote financial devolution and regularise democratic 
elections.
122
  
 
A key citizen participatory accountability mechanism is the village assemblies, which are 
to develop and monitor development plans and assess the performance of Islamic Councils 
representatives. The local plans are to be consolidated into a development plan for the 
entire district by each District Planning Committee. An equally important provision of 
multiple Facilitating Project is both members and chairperson positions in all decentralised 
governance tires: seats reserved for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes are in 
proportion to their population in each state, reserved seats for “other backwardness classes” 
and seats for women. Reserved seats are allocated on rotation, so that in a reserved 
constituency all eligible voters vote for nominated persons from that reserved category in 
one election. The constituency remains reserved for a period of time and then changes to a 
general or other reserved category so as to ensure all communities eventually have the 
possibility of being represented in local governance.
123
 Although there are no reserved seats 
for women, available figures show that due to the opportunity councils provided for 
women, they have more motivation for the success of councils. On the whole, the growth in 
women managers from 1989 to 2003 shows a sixty three percentage increase. 
124
 Zahra 
Shojai states that the level of participation of women members of the local councils was 40 
percent higher than the elections to the fifth Islamic legislative assembly.
125
 In the second 
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term of city councils, six hundred and thirty women were appointed to decision-making 
positions in the Provincial Planning and Development Councils as the highest decision-
making institutions in the provinces. Nahid Musavi argues: 
 
Islamist women are no longer confined to the private sphere of the home. 
They enroll in universities, actively participate in social, economic and 
political life and try to promote their status. they scope of change in their 
self-perception and status  becomes clear when compared  to traditionalist 
religious norms and values according to which women are not allowed to 
leave the home without their father‟s or husband‟s authorisation . Likewise, 
they are not supposed to talk with men who do not belong to their family. 
The presence of several Islamist women in the Majlis (Parliament) and 
Shuras (Islamic Local Councils) some of whom are outspoken, show that 
despite the regressions these women have had important achievements.
126
 
 
Mehrangiz kar, whose secular and feminist stance has made her a renowned figure, 
summarises the evolution of Islamist women in decentralised governance: 
 
Compared to my generation in post revolutionary Iran, girls, especially those 
who belong to religious-traditional families, are very ambitious. They have 
goals and do everything to achieve them….. Influenced by economic and 
religious factors, traditional structures are undergoing change.  Traditional 
families, who, under the Shah, opposed statutory changes, saying that they 
corrupted women, now see religious authorities declaring that women‟s 
education or activity outside the family is compatible with religion. This 
new discourse is a consequence of Islamic women‟s participation in 
revolution and war efforts and their rejection of their traditional roles. Their 
political involvement in the revolution and war efforts led to the 
strengthening of the Islamic regime. Yet, it simultaneously legitimised the 
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demands of these women for the recognition of their social role, and they 
succeeded in forcing the power elite to officially recognise this. They 
continued airing additional demands to promote their status in both the 
private and the public spheres. As a result, traditionalist-religious families 
underwent change. Then, their daughters who were gradually involved in 
public life went even father, criticising legal shortcomings and demanding 
equal rights with men. They keep telling the authorities that they supported 
the Islamic regime to acquire their rights, and that they are determined to 
make their voices hard. Because they refer to Islam, no religious or political 
authority can easily oppose or dismiss their legitimate demands…one of 
these demands is active participation in Local governments.
127
 
 
The Center for Women's Participation 1982 regards decentralised governance as having a 
key role to play in empowering women and enhancing their access and participation in 
social, political and economic policy-making. Additionally, President Khatami adopted a 
policy of fostering women‟s organisations that aimed at women‟s empowerment, rather 
than providing symbolic or direct support for the women‟s movement. He believed that in 
the long-term, women‟s empowerment programs were a more effective mechanism for 
improving women‟s rights.128 The Khatami Government, through the Ministry of the 
Interior, encouraged women to participate actively and enthusiastically in elections for the 
local councils, both as voters and as candidates. The Deputy Minister for Political Affairs, 
the key official for managing the elections, issued guidelines to local authorities, urging 
them to encourage women to participate as candidates. Officials of the Women‟s Bureau of 
the Ministry of the Interior held over one hundred workshops and seminars throughout the 
country to promote the participation of women. To mobilise women, an advocacy NGO 
called the Association for Women‟s Political Participation was created.129 The 
government‟s decentralisation programme has apparently envisaged a twelve-member 
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committee of women for each state, which effectively adds a total of 336 women‟s seats in 
government decision-making levels.
130
 Available figures for 2004 indicate that 7.7 percent 
of the 236,138 Islamic Shuras members in Iran are women.  Women gained about 300 seats 
in 233 cities and 483 villages. One hundred and seventy –seven city councils have more 
than one woman in the local councils. Some councils have four women.
131
 However, about 
15 percent of the women elected do not have reading and writing skills. More than thirty 
percent have primary school education, twenty five percent secondary school (not 
completed), fifteen percent hold high school diplomas, seven percent intermediate level 
(two years college education), seven percent hold university degrees (bachelors) and 
twenty five percent have religious education (Houzeh) and the rest have not declared their 
level of education.
132
 In terms of women representatives‟ employment, fifty five percent 
are housewives, thirty five percent are government employees, three percent are employees 
of the private sector, about four percent are engaged in agricultural activities, two percent 
are carpet weavers and about one percent are university students.
133
 
 
In order to assess the impact and implications of the principle of equality and the right to 
political participation, for women following the Islamic
 
Constitution Law and the Islamic 
Local Councils Law, the states of Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan are worth 
comparing in terms of levels of participation and responsiveness among women local 
government representatives. Hamedan is often cited as an example of good practice in 
decentralised governance, while Sistan and Baluchistan is known for its less successful 
local governance system.  
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4.3 Implementation of Decentralised Governance in Hamedan  
Hamedan is one the most significant states in Iran to implement the Islamic Local Councils 
Law and has the highest percentage of women‟s participation in local government under 
Mosavabe-y Shura-y Islami Shahr-e Hamedan (Islamic Local Councils of Hamedan Act) in 
2003. This progressive Act devolved substantial political, developmental and financial 
powers to a two-tier system of group of villages and district local councils, the former 
having primarily implementing powers for the development plans evolved by the latter. 
Significantly, the district local council‟s chairpersons and vice-chairpersons were given 
ministerial status and the state government did not retain powers of supervision and 
control. Shura-Yars were given statutory recognition as accountability mechanisms for the 
mandate decentralised governance. Elections under the 1987 Law were held in 1999, with a 
high percentage of women‟s participation as voters and candidates into governance.  
 
Following the Islamic Constitutional Law and the Islamic Local Council Laws, Hamedan 
revived its decentralised governance by enacting the Islamic Local Councils of Hamedan 
Act 2003. The Act conforms to all mandatory constitutional requirements in establishing a 
three-tier decentralised governance system. Although there are no articles on reserved 
quotas system in the Hamedan Act, in practice reserved quotas in both member and 
chairperson positions are set at least one-third for women, one-third for backward classes 
and in proportion to their population for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. One-third 
of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and backward class quotas are specifically reserved 
for women of these communities.
134
 
 
 Hamedan has devolved functions, funds and functionaries for all twenty-three 
development areas. Direct elections are held for all local governments‟ members while 
indirect elections are mandated for the chairperson positions. Shura-Yars (Delegations from 
the Centre of Hamedan) meet four times a year to decide upon programme beneficiaries, 
indicate development needs and evaluate local government activities, directions being 
issued for the quorum to include one-third women and Scheduled Castes in proportion to 
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their population.
135
 In addition, from 2003 an annual social audit of village accounts by the 
Shura-Yars being implemented.
136
 
 
By contrast to the 1999 Act, however, the 2003 Act grants wider powers to the state 
government bureaucracy to monitor and direct functioning. Critics have termed this a 
retrograde step for decentralised governance, reducing the powers of the local governments 
(Shuras) to mere development agents of the state government. Various critiques have led to 
the 2003 Act being amended several times, though the 1999 Act powers have not been 
fully restored.
137
 Elections were held to the village Councils (Shura-ye Islami-ye Rosta) in 
1999, followed by elections for the intermediate level Councils and district councils in 
2003. 
 
4.4 Implementation of Decentralised Governance in Sistan and Baluchistan  
The Sistan and Baluchistan decentralised governance Act 1999 established a three-tier 
decentralised system providing reservations for Scheduled Castes and stipulated the 
equality principle between men and women in each local government. The intermediate 
level was primarily charged with planning and development, while the district section 
formed the District Development Council, a coordinating and advisory body with district 
government officials. While significant progress was made by the decentralised governance 
in some development areas under a bureaucracy-run governance arrangement, by the mid-
2003 progress lessened and from 2006 to 2009 the state government signaled its 
unwillingness to devolve political power by continuously stalling local elections.
138
  
 
Re-establishing the state‟s decentralised governance system, the Zahedan Act 2003 
complies with all the mandatory Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran Law and Islamic 
Local Councils Law provisions and provides for direct elections of all local governments‟ 
members and village governance chairpersons. There are no reservations for one-third of 
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both member and chairperson positions for women, while reservations for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes are in proportion to their population.
139
 Unlike Hamedan, 
however, the Sistan and  Baluchistan (Zahedan) government has not devolved funds and 
administrative functionaries in any of the stipulated fourteen development areas, while full 
devolution of functions has been prescribed without legally authorised, delineated decision-
making powers. Autonomy for the decentralised governance is further lessened by the lack 
of local government supervision over state development officials and the District Collectors 
„discretionary powers to dissolve village governance and remove chairpersons.140  
 
Shura-Yars have been constituted that meet at least four times a year to select beneficiaries 
for development programmes, approve local government audit reports as well as develop 
and monitor development plans. The mandatory quorum of one-tenth of all Shura-Yars 
members fails to include any gender or caste specifications.
141
 Despite serious limitations 
in political devolution in Sistan and Baluchistan, however, in 1999 Sistan and Baluchistan 
local government elections took place, followed by a second and third round of elections in 
2003 and 2007.  
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5. Trends Emerging from Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan Case Study  
Women in Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan accessing their right to political 
participation through the Facilitating Project in decentralised governance have to negotiate 
the “rent-seeking structures of political parties, the command-and-control system of the 
bureaucracy and the organised caste and class interests” which all have the potential to co-
opt or render voiceless elected women representatives.
142
 Women‟s access, participation 
and responsiveness in the decentralised governance, therefore, must be judged against an 
array of social, economic and political, as well as personal, familial and institutional 
factors, in order to determine the effectiveness of the women‟s Facilitating Project in 
engendering local governments, policies and programmes.  
 
5.1 Affirmative Action and Democratic Elections  
Regular, free and fair elections for decentralised institutions, coupled with the Facilitating 
Project, aim to democratise politics by formally countering unequal local socio-political 
power structures. In both Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan almost all women elected to 
local governments came through the Facilitating Project
143
, signifying the role of the 
Facilitating Project in shaping political representation of marginalised groups. Moreover, 
Hamedan, with its longer history of women‟s participation in politics and in decentralised 
governance, has also managed to exceed its women‟s participation in local governments 
and women occupy 42 percent of Hamedan local government‟s seats. Social change is also 
indicated by women contesting general seats. By comparison, in Sistan and Baluchistan 
women‟s representation aligns with less than 20 percent.144  
 
The role of the Facilitating Project in crossing caste barriers, however, appears to be less 
than for crossing gender barriers per se. Studies in Sistan and Baluchistan reveal that most 
women local government representatives come from the dominant castes.
145
 Similarly, 
dominant caste women, especially from the main landholding Malayer and Asad Abad 
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castes, fill Hamadan‟s reservations in decentralised governance.146 In both states Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis women entered mainly through their Scheduled Caste ethnicity reserved 
category in the Facilitating Project. That few Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women access 
general women or Scheduled Caste reservations serves to highlight the interlinking caste 
and gender discrimination these women encounter in political participation. Moreover, 
Lakis women representation remains consistently less in Hamedan‟s higher decentralised 
governance tiers, revealing their smaller political space in more politically powerful 
positions.
147
  
 
Social opposition to women‟s portion of participation has been less than for Scheduled 
Caste portion. One Hamedan study revealed that 70 percent of people welcomed 
participation of women in decentralised governance, though 30 percent suggested 
allocation of seats be based on education levels to ensure minimum capability.
148
 Such 
requirement, however, would effectively exclude many Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women 
who have lower education levels. There is also a practical restriction on Hazara Baluchs 
and Lakis women‟s contacts outside of their own ethnic communities. These women‟s 
ability to speak Persian (the official language) is not as developed as men‟s, and most are 
unable to conduct complex transactions in Persian. While women encountered patriarchal 
restrictions, harassment and sometimes forced withdrawal of nominations for seats, 
outright opposition during elections was less frequent. Women in Sistan and Baluchistan, 
however, faced much more opposition than their counterparts in Hamedan due to the 
virtual absence of elections for a decade allowing decentralised governance affairs to be 
arranged between unaccountable local elites and the bureaucracy.
149
 
 
 Dominant caste opposition in both states is strong where Lakis and Hazara Baluchs 
assume reserved chairperson positions, particularly at the village level, as this directly 
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challenges the social ordering of power relations.
150
 Lakis‟ lesser access to political power 
or patronage networks in Hamedan means that Scheduled Caste reserved member positions 
are not seen as threatening compared to the more heavily contested backward caste seats.
151
 
 
 In Sistan and Baluchistan, by contrast, the 1999 decentralised governance elections were 
marred by dominant caste resistance to Hazara Baluchs‟ perceived upward mobility 
through reservations in local institutions, leading to blockades, violence and intimidation to 
prevent Hazara Baluchs from filing nominations.
152
 Similar caste tensions during the 2003 
elections resulted for Hazara Baluchs women and their participation in local decision-
making.
153
 A Hazara Baluch woman was physically assaulted and threatened into 
withdrawing her nomination and kidnapping of her daughter‟s children.154 
 
Access to fair and equal opportunity in participation also highlights the issue of women‟s 
independence in contesting elections, given socio-culturally constrained female activity in 
the public sphere leading to their relative lack of political experience. The roots of 
inequality in the public sphere can often start with discriminatory attitudes and practices 
and unequal relations between men and women within the family. “Activities away from 
the residence require that some persons stay home; it is women and not men who remain 
behind.”155 Part of this is due to the demands of child care; part also rests on an ideology 
that limits the access of females to external contacts, out of concern for their safety and 
modesty, the legitimacy of their husband‟s children, and the honor of the family and 
lineage.
156
 The unequal division of labour and responsibilities within households based on 
unequal power relations also limits women‟s potential to find the time and develop the 
skills required for participation in decision-making in wider public fora. The ideology also 
includes the notion that females are unable to conduct economic and political transactions 
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adequately because of the lack of the necessary knowledge in these realms.
157
 One local 
government member in Sistan and Baluchistan argues: 
It is obvious that men want to dominate their wives in Sistan and Baluchistan. 
Women‟s economic dependence on men is the best way to guarantee men‟s 
superiority over women. Women‟s economic activity makes them 
independent and avoids their domination by men.
158
  
 
On the other hand, the tradition and culture of the ethnic groups are discriminatory to 
women. For example, among Lakis, only women who have reached the stages of Arvad 
(wife, essentially an “established married woman”, a stage reached after two or three years 
of marriage or the birth and survival of a son); and Qoja Arvad or Qoja Nana (old woman, 
a stage reached around menopause) have influence in the community. Therefore, a woman 
becomes eligible to participate in activities of the community when she acquires through 
marriage full membership in larger society.
159
 A study in Sistan and Baluchistan shows that 
men of the Baluchs are differentiated and ranked in a number of ways- particularly by birth 
order, by age, and by wealth- and a woman is greatly affected by this ranking system, for 
her ascribed status is directly linked with the position of her father and then her husband in 
the community. Being thus identified with her husband (principally because of the stability 
of marriage), a woman is involved, albeit indirectly, in her husband‟s concerns in all areas 
of social and political life such as in local governments.
160
 The other factor of 
discriminatory attitudes to women is the participation of women in religious institutions 
such as Khayr-u Sharr (Right and Wrong).  The ideology of Khayr-u Sharr is the basis of a 
network; every married woman is linked with another married woman, each of whom has 
Khayr-u Sharr ties with yet others. It is clear that women outside of this institution have no 
chance to participate in local government elections or win a seat.
161
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Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, Former Central Council member of Tahkim-e Vahdat, identified 
two main reasons for no access to equal participation in the local institutions especially in 
intermediate and village levels:  
Women, in general assemblies and various offices had always been in the minority 
and `this minority was not active. The environment in the small towns and villages 
were not conductive to females becoming active and visible in local organisation 
activities. Also, in a male-dominated place, men have fewer competitors.
162
 
 
Ms. Haghighatjoo did not see men overtly creating obstacles to the presence of women in 
Tahkim-e Vahdat and other local organisations: “In fact, I did not see any active women 
during my membership; otherwise, they would have been successful. However, this does 
not mean that the challenges are minor. Women of all ages know that they have to put forth 
more effort in order to solve these problems and cannot give up or retreat. I never wanted 
to be a chairperson, because I knew that men would not handle it well.”163 Women are not 
necessarily at fault here, according to Ms. Haghighatjoo: “Male-dominated culture 
overshadows the competition and makes it more difficult for women in general and ethnic 
women in particular.”164  
 
Women who seek advancement in politics have been regarded as a power hungry or 
strange in some way, while the same attempts by men are regarded as courageous and 
legitimate. These realities erode the confidence of many women. Instead of affirmative 
action for women to compensate negative historical discrimination, they have always 
confronted those men who view women‟s political progress as an insult to their identity. 
Hence, one consequence of constitutionally mandated women‟s equal rights is lessening 
family and community resistance to women contesting decentralised governance elections 
and instead male initiatives to promote family members to reserved seats, though this 
appears to be brought about by the threat of women‟s independence rather than concerns 
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for gender equity.
165
 Women‟s productive and reproductive roles in the private and public 
spheres, however, often meant their male relatives or caste community canvassed for votes 
in their stead in Sistan and Baluchistan. Women‟s issues, therefore, were rarely raised in 
election campaigns. 
166
 
 
Based on the need to fill the reserved seats for caste, class and patriarchal power structures 
pushed many men as well as women into contesting of their own accord. In both states self-
motivated nominations were considerably less as compared to families and husbands 
motivating women to contest decentralised governance seats, followed by politically active 
husbands, political parties and community members.
167
 A study in Iran shows that a strong 
and close female affiliation with political parties will guarantee their success in 
decentralised governance.
168
 In the first election, reformist candidates gained the majority 
of seats in the cities and villages and women competed successfully in a number of 
districts. Hard-line conservatives swept the 2003 municipal elections, but then failed to 
control any local council in the 2007 elections.
169
 This situation lends itself to women 
acting as proxy representatives for their husbands, male relatives or dominant caste 
villagers and political parties. Whether coerced nominations reduce over time is debatable: 
one positive sign emerging from the 2003 Hamedan elections is that more women than 
previously indicated that they were interested in political participation, though few women 
were re-elected to decentralised governance.
170
  
 
As far as Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women are concerned, dominant caste villagers are 
able to substantially control political activity of “lower” castes by interlinking their control 
over land, labour and credit markets, as well as their village leadership positions and 
stronger political party affiliations. Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women across the states 
being primarily engaged in agricultural labour, economic dependency on landed dominant 
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castes gave rise to a situation where some Lakis and Hazara Baluchs women were coerced 
into participate in decentralised governance seats as proxy representatives for their 
landlord-patrons or dominant caste local governments members.
171
 Moreover, as Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis form a minority in some villages and all voters in local governments 
select persons from the reserved category, effectively it is the dominant castes who decide 
elections to Scheduled Caste reserved constituencies with serious implications for Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis women‟s political independence. 
 
Despite political parties being barred from influencing village decentralised governance 
elections, election canvassing in the villages is along party lines in both states (Hamedan, 
2003; Zahedan, 2003). The last local governments‟ elections in both states have been won 
by the ruling governments at the time, indicating that party-based election campaigns and 
ruling party power alignments play a significant role in determining representation 
outcomes. Many women, however, did not receive independent party support for their 
nominations in Sistan and Baluchistan, due to their weak political affiliations and non-party 
functionary status. Women‟s party allegiance, instead, invariably followed that of their 
family and thereby shaped their entry into political life.
172
  At the intermediate and district 
decentralised governance levels, where elections are contested on party lines, a clear link 
between political parties and family political connections is apparent. Women were often 
nominated to these local governments by politically active male relatives or male elites, 
with “other backward caste” parties in particular influencing elections to women‟s 
participation and win seats. This often excluded less politically connected Hazara Baluchs 
and Lakis women from entry through general women‟s participation in politics.173 Mr. 
Afshari, former board member and political secretary of Women Council organisation in 
Sistan and Baluchistan, acknowledges: 
The aggressive presence of men in political activities and pursuits has left little 
room for women. With the exception of a few exceptional individuals, women who 
have been successful in Iran‟s political scene have male relatives supporting them 
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and assisting them in climbing the political hierarchy through their connections. 
Although there are many smart, competent women in Iran, not all of them enjoy the 
same access. If these women speak their minds and engage in criticism (or if they 
support women‟s rights) they will be attacked and marginalised. This reality will 
affect Councils, even a democratic one.
174
 
 
Finally, many women were also unanimously elected to village Islamic Shuras in both 
states, the influence of customary or traditional village Shuras, comprising village elders of 
most castes, over selection of women representatives in local governments being clearly 
visible.
175
 The traditional local governance thereby excluded other more politically 
motivated women from contesting elections. Village Facilitators are also advocates of 
affirmative action and positive discrimination to allocate a certain quota for female 
members in local governments. They also report, whether it is true or not, that women have 
to be empowered first, but if there is no will to use their expertise, they will only be 
disappointed and alienated.
176
 In addition, Baluchs women representatives were often 
forced not to contest the next elections in order to suppress those who had formed a strong 
social identity and taken leadership initiatives, who might then question the power of 
traditional decentralised governance (Shuras).
177
  
 
5.2 Women and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis Women in Governance Institutions  
Once women enter into decentralised governance through affirmative action like the 
Facilitating Project in Iran, their ability to actively participate in local governments fora 
such as: meetings, committees, Shura-yars and interactions with their constituency and 
higher officials, is circumscribed by an array of factors related to their socio-economic and 
political status. The quality of women‟s participation in decision-making processes, 
therefore, provides a measure of their empowerment as a result of formal representation in 
governance through Islamic Local Councils Law.  
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Substantial numbers of women entering through the Facilitating Project in both states serve 
as proxy representatives for their fathers, brothers, husbands, older sons and other male 
relatives or dominant caste patrons, which destroys lines of accountability from women 
representatives to their constituency. Marziyeh Dabagh affirms that each time they 
[women] wished to present motions especially concerning the condition of women, they 
had to first talk to and persuade every single male member in decentralised governance. 
Then they had to take the motion to the commissions to convince the members of its 
validity before presenting it to the general assembly in local governments.
178
 Evidence 
shows men attending local governments meetings on behalf of women representatives, or 
women representatives merely rubber-stamping local governments‟ decisions.179 Despite 
this trend of tokenistic women‟s representation in decentralised governance, estimated to 
be the case for at least 15 percent of Sistan and Baluchistan women representatives,
180
 
studies in both states indicate that many women representatives attend the local 
governments meetings fairly regularly. Most women, however, are escorted to and from 
meetings by male relatives, who often advise them on what to say in the meetings.
181
 
Particularly when decentralised governance activities are held late in the night, or if higher 
officials have to be met, male relatives often attend to Shura-e Rosta (village decentralised 
governance) affairs on behalf of the woman representative.
182
 
 
Women representatives also face near exclusion from participation in and thereby influence 
over the decentralised governance committees which advise on development and social 
justice issues. While more nominally functioning at the village decentralised governance 
level in Hamedan, these committees exert influence on development decisions in higher 
decentralised governance tiers. Studies reveal that most women representatives in both 
states are unaware of the existence of the committees. Similarly, many women village 
decentralised governance representatives in Sistan and Baluchistan are unfamiliar with the 
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functions of Shura-Yar
183
 and often do not attend Shura-Yar meetings, raising questions of 
accountability and responsiveness to their constituency. 
184
 
 
Women‟s participation and voice is greater in higher decentralised governance tiers than in 
the village decentralised governance due to generally better education levels, higher socio-
economic status, greater political ambitions or family history in politics.
185
A similar pattern 
emerges as regards women‟s ability to interact with their constituency. Women village 
decentralised governance representatives face greater social restrictions on their freedom of 
movement than in higher decentralised governance tiers: husbands often interact with 
villagers on their wives‟ behalf where several villages fall under one  Islamic Shura in 
Hamedan, while many women visit  Shuras offices solely to attend meetings.
186
 
 
Patriarchal norms circumscribing women‟s behaviour in the public sphere play a significant 
role in generating resistance to women‟s participation in the decentralised governance. 
Non-acceptance by Hamedani men of women in positions of local authority is explained by 
women‟s rapid ascendancy into political life through participation in the Facilitating 
Project being seen not only as “a loss of face, but of power that has been exercised without 
any gender controls till now.”187 The disrespect, non-cooperation or sexual harassment 
women representatives encounter from male colleagues when exercising their voice in 
decentralised governance fora often renders their participation ineffective. In addition, 
decentralised governance activities and financial matters are often decided without 
consulting women decentralised governance members, or women presidents are pressurised 
to merely rubber-stamp decisions taken by male decentralised governance members.
188
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The traditional village decentralised governance  also play a role in undermining village 
decentralised governance decisions taken by women and Hazara Baluchs women 
presidents, due to their control over the common property resources and role in social and 
judicial matters in  Sistan and Baluchistan villages.
189
 Village elders in Hamedan are often 
consulted on formal village decentralised governance decisions as regards distribution of 
development benefits, and they provide support for those members they nominate into 
political positions.
190
 The result is that women‟s participation is undermined by traditional 
male authority in the village, unless they are able to find a strong male patron to back them.  
 
Women‟s voicelessness in decentralised governance is particularly acute where women 
lack education, previous political experience and social capital. Literacy links to women‟s 
access to information and understanding of local governments (Shuras) functions and 
resources, evidence coming from mass literacy campaigns in Sistan and Baluchistan 
enhancing women representatives‟ abilities to articulate women‟s concerns in decentralised 
governance fora.
191
 The Facilitating project through training programmes to make women 
aware of their rights and duties in decentralised governance and to equip them with skills to 
participate in political decision-making, are also crucial. Whereas the 2003 Hamedan local 
governments elections saw a high percentage of women become proxy representatives, by 
the 2007 elections when training programmes had been implemented tokenistic women‟s 
representation reduced.
192
  
 
Social capital, that is, associational activity in the public sphere among women that forms 
networks for collective action, serves as another enabling factor in women‟s active 
citizenship, access to information and effective political participation, as well as enhancing 
their interaction with their constituency. Building social capital is pertinent for rural Iranian 
women, and especially women from ethnic groups such as Hazara Baluchs and Lakis, as 
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women in general have less social capital than men due to social norms that restrict their 
associational activity outside of their family and caste groups.
193
 
  
Either there is no guaranteeing Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women‟s political representation 
through the Islamic Local Councils Law and the Facilitating Project training programmes 
or we cannot remove their socio-economic deprivation and the unequal caste-based power 
equations that weigh against them asserting equal rights in governance. Hazara Baluchs and 
Lakis women tend to have less voice than other women in decentralised governance 
institutions, dominant caste women being relatively more secure in public life due to 
community support.
194
 Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women also differ in their perceptions of 
caste and class factors hindering their political participation, as compared to dominant caste 
women attributing hurdles to gender inequalities.
195
  
 
The result is that Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women in both states either do not participate 
in decentralised governance, or do so under the direction of local dominant caste elites. 
Moreover, many Hazara Baluchs women face caste abuse, harassment and humiliation in 
exercising their right of political participation. Untouchability practices are manifested 
within local governments‟ offices, Hazara Baluchs women often being prevented from 
drinking water from common water jugs or eating at the same table. Caste discrimination 
further operates to undermine the capacity of this group of women to chair local 
governments, a particular problem being posed by dominant caste male vice-presidents 
who tend to often control decision-making.
196
 
 
Participation by less economically secure women such as Lakis and Hazara Baluchs 
women in the decentralised governance is further constrained by their engagement in 
waged work in addition to their work within the household. Hence, forfeiting a day‟s wages 
in attending to unpaid decentralised governance duties poses a heavy burden on these 
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women.
197
 Imbalances in ownership of productive assets, especially land in an agrarian 
context, make rural Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women more economically vulnerable. In 
both states, land reforms in 1963 redistributed land to the backwards castes, marking the 
rise in socio-political power of these communities, but without similar benefits accruing to 
the Hazara Baluchs and Lakis.
198
  In the absence of freedom from want, therefore, Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis women often align themselves with socio-politically dominant caste 
patrons in order to secure their livelihood, thus impinging on their free exercise of political 
power.  
 
 Similarly, the drawbacks of political party nomination of women, including at the village 
local governance level, are that women‟s participation in decision-making is thereby 
circumscribed by party interests that are mostly shaped by male party members.
199
 
Moreover, given the growth of caste-based politics and the fact that many dominant caste 
elites are political party functionaries, this again ultimately strengthens their political 
control. Threats and violence against women representatives in the two higher 
decentralised governance tiers by members of opposition political parties have also been 
noted in Sistan and Baluchistan: one woman representative had to carry around a gun 
following the assault of her husband and sons by opposition party members following her 
election.
200
 
 
 Patriarchal and casteist attitudes in state institutions further foster discrimination against 
women and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women Islamic Shura representatives exercising 
executive authority, with government officials and bureaucrats often failing to attend to 
their requests. Studies reveal that officials in Sistan and Baluchistan often feel more 
comfortable talking with male relatives of women representatives, reinforcing women 
representatives‟ disempowerment.201  
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 In addition to constraints imposed by women‟s socio-political milieu, several institutional 
features further limit women‟s enjoyment of their right to participation in local governance. 
In Sistan and Baluchistan constraints primarily flow from the failure to adequately devolve 
functions, funds and functionaries to the decentralised governance, while in Hamedan state 
supervisory powers over decentralised governance are criticised for hampering the 
effective participation of local representatives in development planning and 
implementation. Another impediment is the misuse of “no-confidence motions” passed by 
decentralised members in both states, or by District Collectors using their wide 
discretionary powers in Sistan and Baluchistan, in order to oust women and Hazara 
Baluchs presidents and put in charge mainly male, dominant caste vice-presidents. A 2002 
study in Iranshahr district in Sistan and Baluchistan revealed that all village decentralised 
governance presidents dismissed by the District Collector were Hazara Baluchs,
202
 while 
Lakis women in Hamedan are similarly vulnerable to no-confidence motions due to their 
low social status.
203
  
 
Moreover, in Hamedan, the opportunity for  seats  for chairpersons rotate every twenty- 
four months, as compared to member seats in both Sistan and Baluchistan and Hamedan 
and chairperson seats in Sistan and Baluchistan rotating every two Islamic Shuras terms. 
The detrimental impact of this short tenure for Hamedan‟s women chairpersons is that they 
fail to build up adequate leadership skills and exhibit responsiveness to their constituency, 
and their authority weakens.
204
 Critics also point to the waste of women‟s resources, given 
that most women would not be able to win re-election in the absence of reserved quotas,
205
 
as well as the serious issue of weakening accountability where the sanction of the ballot is 
not present.
206
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5.3 Responsiveness – Positive Policy Outputs  
Despite the aforementioned factors that hinder women elected decentralised governance 
representatives from active, empowered participation in local governance, few studies have 
attempted to evaluate objectively the developmental impact of women entering 
decentralised governance institutions following the implementation of constitutionally-
mandated women‟s right to political participation. Measuring responsiveness in terms of 
positive policy outputs specifically for women and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis is also 
difficult given the inadequate political autonomy for decentralised governance in Hamedan 
and especially Sistan and Baluchistan. This has resulted in bureaucracy-run decentralised 
governance primarily implementing state government development programmes.
207
This 
aside, as decentralised governance institutions deal with political, social and economic 
issues cutting across both the public and private spheres in which women operate, 
theoretically women elected representatives should be directly motivated to take up both 
women‟s practical and strategic gender needs. 
 
Hamedan studies on decentralised governance however, have highlighted the lack of 
consistent evidence linking enhanced participation through the Facilitating Project with 
better institutional performance, particularly in terms of greater responsiveness to women 
and Lakis‟ needs. This is particularly the case at the village decentralised governance level, 
where caste and patriarchal norms are more entrenched and where decentralisation often 
operates to increase the share of resources going to bureaucrats and local elites instead of to 
marginalised social groups.
208
 In the absence of female decentralised governance leaders as 
role models, women are also left to negotiate existing male-dominated power structures 
that often render women‟s interests invisible. This is especially the case for many Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis women, who are forced to underplay their social identity in order to gain 
cooperation from other dominant caste decentralised governance members.
209
 More 
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positive indications, however, are women representatives demanding greater transparency 
in decentralised governance affairs, thereby contributing to reducing corruption.
210
  
 
More recent studies suggest that for women who are able to actively participate in 
decentralised governance fora in Hamedan and undertake micro-level development 
initiatives, such as improving sanitation, may not be recognised by male-dominated Islamic 
Shuras.
211
 Party politics and decision-making along party lines in the decentralised 
governance also play a role in circumscribing responsiveness and diluting the effectiveness 
of the Facilitating Project, with women identifying with the party agenda instead of gender 
issues.
212
 Despite these hurdles, some women representatives in Hamedan have raised 
social justice, education and women‟s health issues.213 Other women also generally 
perceive women representatives as more approachable. Greater training as in the third 
round Hamedan local governments in 2003, moreover, provides the potential for enabling 
greater responsiveness by women representatives.  
 
Sistan and Baluchistan women representatives attending to natural resource protection and 
provision of basic public services such as water supply have catered to women‟s practical 
needs, raising slightly women representatives‟ political awareness and their respect within 
the village.
214
 Taking up more strategic gender needs, such as combating the widespread 
illicit smuggling and trafficking problem affecting women‟s lives, however, often brings 
women representatives up against more overt opposition from men and even the police.
215
 
A hindering factor is the lack of capacity building programmes for women representatives 
in the state to enhance their human capital and ability to articulate woman‟s development 
needs.
216
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The impact of dominant male elites‟ hostility is particularly felt when Sistan and 
Baluchistan women decentralised governance members start to assert their agency by 
taking decisions, voicing queries on decentralised governance activities, or demanding 
accountability and challenging gender inequalities. Deliberate withholding of funds and 
sanction for development programmes in women‟s wards is one tactic utilised to destroy 
women representatives‟ status among their constituency. Other tactics include harassment 
or violence.
217
 An example is the murder of the Hazara Baluch woman president of 
Bashkardi village Islamic Shura in Sistan and Baluchistan in 2000. She had roused male 
local party members‟ hostility by her efforts to provide basic public services, protect 
common property resources and tackle social justice issues such as child labour and caste 
discriminatory practices.
218
 
 
Circumscriptions on Lakis and Hazara Baluchs women representatives‟ participation and 
voice in Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan decentralised governance has direct bearing 
on their inability to successfully tackle social justice issues, as well as more equitable 
demands for basic services such as water supply and benefits from common property 
resources.
219
 Indications are that Lakis representatives in Hamedan have not yet gained 
political power, despite reservations in the decentralised governance. Hence development 
benefits continue to be diverted away from their community, funds for Scheduled Caste 
development even being returned to the state government unspent.
220
  
 
Moreover, as gender identities are fractured by caste and class identities, women‟s 
participation in political life is also structured along caste (community) lines. Dominant 
caste women, therefore, tend not to identify with “lower” caste women or are unwilling to 
challenge caste power equations by enhancing Lakis and Hazara Baluchs women‟s voice in 
governance. A clear example is a dominant caste woman in Hamedan taking up the issue of 
a broken water pipe to the Lakis colony, who was asked by her own community why she 
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bothered when it was “their problem, not ours.”221 An earlier Hamedan study has also 
noted that whereas Lakis‟ district council members raised more community-based issues, 
women councilors tended to raise more general issues and not those specifically pertinent 
to women‟s needs.222  
 
Hence, issues of multiple social identities among women, their overall lack of effective, 
empowered participation, proxy politics and patronage systems, socio-economic 
inequalities, and non-consolidation of women‟s practical and strategic gender needs 
combine to severely diminish the ability of women representatives to engender governance 
and development. It is these points that have to be viewed against the positive factors of the 
affirmative action of the Facilitating Project, which have enabled Iranian women to enter 
into local political institutions en masse, beginning the process of political awareness and 
participation among women. 
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6. Evaluating the Impact of Affirmative Action in Governance 
The case study of women in decentralized governance in Hamedan and Sistan and 
Baluchistan reveals a myriad of interlinking personal, familial, social, economic, political 
and institutional factors influencing the effectiveness of affirmative action through the 
Facilitating Project in engendering governance. Aside from institutional hurdles posed by 
inadequate political devolution in Sistan and Baluchistan and increasingly bureaucracy-run 
development programming in Hamedan, creating more democratic institutions through 
affirmative action has not led automatically to democratic politics and equitable 
developmental outcomes for marginalised women and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women in 
particular. Women have gained political authority, but not necessarily substantial power 
deriving from their new political status so as to transform governance.
223
 
6.1 Conclusion from Case Study 
It is indisputable that the legal affirmative action of the Facilitating Project can bring about 
a “critical mass” of women‟s representation in governance that might otherwise not be 
present. The fact that almost all Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan women entered into 
decentralised governance through seats indicates the male-dominated local political terrain 
that overrides de facto equality of opportunity for political participation. Countering 
arguments that affirmative action “ghettoises” women into only contesting seats in local 
governments, encouraging signs of Hamedan women increasingly entering decentralised 
governance through general seats reveals that affirmative action can also transform male-
biased participation patterns over time. By contrast, the caste and gender discriminatory 
norms that bar Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women from contesting either general women or 
Scheduled Caste reserved seats expose the limitations of affirmative action in transcending 
other immutable social factors that intersect with gender and produce multiple levels of 
exclusion among women. 
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Given that affirmative action operates as a blunt instrument for redistributing political 
authority, it can invoke counter-productive trends of resistance and gender violence, 
especially where reserved seats through the Facilitating Project directly challenge 
hierarchical social power structures: an example is the strong dominant caste opposition to 
Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women contesting reserved decentralised governance 
chairperson positions. Opposition to the women‟s Facilitating Project, however, can be 
manifested more subtly through informal patterns of male dominance exerted over women 
representatives that effectively counter their independent election to and participation in 
governance. The pressure to fill reserved seats and encourage women to have active 
participation, as shown from the case study, can result in many women being coerced, 
primarily by their family members and husband, but also by political parties, their (caste) 
community and traditional sources of leadership, into contesting political elections. The 
danger lies thereafter in reducing the effect of affirmative action to tokenistic women‟s 
representation, with women ceding political power to their male relatives and patrons. 
Once women enter en masse into governance through the affirmative action Facilitating 
Project, there is no conclusive evidence pointing to their transformative or empowered 
participation in governance institutions. The paradox of participation through affirmative 
action for Hamedan and Sistan and Baluchistan women is not only has it provided an 
opportunity to win the reserved seats provided an opportunity for women in general, and 
Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women in particular, but the Facilitating Project has also served 
as an opportunity for strengthening local male, dominant caste elite capture of decentralised 
governance. In the absence of measures by the state to endow women with equal social and 
economic rights, structures of gender, race/caste and class decisively shape women‟s 
participation in processes of governance. Aside from women‟s political participation 
through the Facilitating Project being subverted by proxy representation of male relatives 
and patrons, wide-ranging social resistance to women‟s right to political participation from 
both informal social structures and dominant male political elites has been shown to render 
women‟s participation ineffective, thus preventing the disruption and eventual restructuring 
of gender power relations in the public sphere. Gender discrimination is further manifested 
in women representatives‟ interactions with government officials and bureaucrats, who 
 59 
often override the executive authority vested in women. Competitive party politics can also 
fail to enable women‟s participation in governance due to political party disregard for 
gender needs over party interests, those party interests being shaped by male party 
members and thus further entrenching gender power imbalances in governance. 
Additional factors such as women‟s lower literacy rates, lack of trainings and low social 
capital link to the social norms that control women‟s capacity to exercise agency in their 
lives and claim their right to political participation. Social controls over women‟s freedom 
of movement in the public sphere in particular, effectively prevent women representatives 
from interacting with their constituency and building social capital and information 
networks, with implications for their accountability and responsiveness in governance.  
Within the category of women, those women who possess lower human and economic 
capital, and have circumscribed choices and lower self-esteem due to other interlinking 
factors of race, caste or class, generally face greater political hurdles in exercising 
independent voice in governance. As one researcher has observed, that Hazara Baluchs 
exercise little voice in decentralised governance despite two decades of mandated 
affirmative action highlights the limited role affirmative action politics has played in 
transforming Hazara Baluchs‟ experiences of social and political exclusion.224 
The interplay of these constraining factors on women‟s empowered participation in 
governance highlights that political power attaches to the person and their social position, 
and not to the position itself.
225
 Flowing from this understanding is that unless gender, race, 
caste and other structural inequalities in the distribution of social and economic 
entitlements are addressed, women are more likely to fail to translate the opportunity 
affirmative action presents for formal representation into political empowerment and 
meaningful participation. 
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Inequitable local socio-economic and political power structures, ineffective institutional 
and public accountability mechanisms, and women‟s lack of empowered political 
participation combine to lessen women representatives‟ responsiveness to their 
constituency and especially women‟s needs.226 Studies from both Hamedan and Sistan and 
Baluchistan indicate that women in local governance may respond at least to women‟s 
practical gender needs, but that they face greater opposition and hence most often fail to 
engage with women‟s strategic gender needs. Moreover, many women representatives lack 
the capacity to represent women‟s interests, given their low human and social capital, or 
other hindering factors such as race, caste or class discrimination. Other social categories 
such as race or caste also cut across gender, which can negate more privileged women‟s 
support for the interests of women of lower socio-economic status, dispelling the myth that 
women automatically will support women-specific interests.  
Political inclusion through affirmative action, therefore, would appear to be inadequate on 
its own to transform women‟s socio-economic conditions and lead to democratic politics. 
Affirmative action may be necessary for women‟s inclusion in political spaces where 
severe gender imbalances in governance exist. The presence of women in governance has 
potential not only to equip some women with political skills in order to fulfil their mobility 
aspirations, but also to serve as role models for other women. Women‟s representation can 
also increase a culture of political participation and create new forms of mobilisation, 
especially where affirmative action is entrenched as a legal right that women can claim.
227
 
In this regard, women‟s greater political motivation in Hamedan and Sistan and 
Baluchistan in the second-round elections in 2003 indicates that co-option of women into 
ethnic reserved seats may lessen over time. For socially excluded Hazara Baluchs and 
Lakis women in particular, reservations in decentralised governance have brought about a 
new awareness of their ability to hold political power for the first time. This pushes them 
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into new arenas of struggle at the local level and, when organised, gains the Hazara 
Baluchs and Lakis communities more leverage with local dominant castes.
228
 
What has to be recognised is that affirmative action is social engineering from above; it is 
rarely driven by empowered women demanding this right. The challenge, therefore, lies in 
meeting the rapid transformation of representative politics and political opportunities 
arising from affirmative action with similarly rapid processes of empowering women to 
actively participate in governance. Focus must shift from viewing affirmative action as the 
only option for enhancing women‟s capabilities. Instead, a multi-pronged strategy is 
required that synthesises women‟s practical gender needs with more strategic or structural 
needs of access to socio-economic resources and inclusion in political and other civil 
society organisations, in order to build women‟s power to realise their rights.229 
6.2   Recommendations for Engendering Governance through Rights  
A rights-based approach to engendering governance requires a simultaneous empowering 
process of education, political mobilisation and capabilitiesof women to strengthen their 
claim to access rights to gain seats and political participation. This approach, however, has 
to be complemented by strong state policies and resources placed into implementing social 
and economic reforms to break the social and political control of local male elites.
230
 For 
many educated, working women, economic and political activities have become integral 
parts of their identity. These women, who establish social relationships through their 
activities outside of the home, perceive work as a means to gaining autonomy and respect. 
Increasing women‟s ownership of assets, and especially land in an agrarian context, is 
essential. Equally important are reforming patriarchal and other debilitating socio-cultural 
norms that limit women‟s participation in the public sphere.  
The duty of the state to fulfill women‟s right to political participation must be broadened to 
mandating women‟s representation at all levels and processes of governance, 
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complemented by adequate funds being set aside for women‟s development. Other 
institutional reforms include ensuring women are able to serve out their full term without 
the misuse of institutional mechanisms such as no-confidence motions, and the 
involvement of women‟s groups in development programmes.231 Building a professional, 
gender-equitable and gender-sensitive civil service has to be complemented by state 
provision of the institutional framework for capacity building programmes for women 
representatives. Moreover, the urgent need of many marginalised women to build human 
capital must be addressed through the state fulfilling its duty to guarantee women‟s 
fundamental right to education that leads to eradicate clichés and negative gender 
stereotyping. 
Dissemination of information though media and publicity campaigns to women about 
political affairs further aids the process of women‟s political empowerment. An example is 
the state-owned radio broadcast of a soap opera aimed at building understanding of 
decentralised governance in Hamedan, which could also specifically focus on women‟s 
participation.
232
 A further innovative government-civil society initiative from Hamedan has 
been the scaled-up Shura-Yar training programme for village decentralised governance. 
The programme introduces an interactive session via satellite technology between women 
representatives in different district headquarters throughout the state to explore and develop 
methodologies based around women‟s interests, establish information exchanges and 
increase women‟s political motivation.233 
The slow process of women‟s empowerment through political representation suggests that 
political parties can increase the pace of progress. Fostering competition between political 
parties can work for realising women‟s needs, especially where women aggregate sufficient 
social capital in order to pressurise parties to include gender interests.
234
 Political parties, 
however, need to be internally democratised through the inclusion of more women and 
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must build greater links with women voters so as to incorporate women‟s interests into 
party platforms.
235
 
 
Civil society actors can also play an important role in empowering women political 
representatives to take up leadership roles and represent women‟s interests by focusing on 
capacity building programmes based on women‟s experiences in governance. These 
training programmes must not only build women‟s knowledge of governance functions and 
capacity to participate in governance, but also enhance their knowledge of their rights so as 
to raise women‟s critical consciousness of their socio-economic and political 
powerlessness, and interlinking gender and other social inequalities that pervade political 
spaces.
236
 The Lakis movement in Hamedan, for example, focuses on an integrated 
programme to sustain Lakis‟ political participation, combining support for Lakis accessing 
reservations in Islamic decentralised governance with claims for socio-economic rights, 
particularly land rights, and cultural resurgence as a tool for building a positive community 
identity. 
237
 
Another key civil society role is to aid with forming associations among women in 
governance that facilitate women representatives‟ networking, sharing of experiences and 
support for each other in their political positions. Three such civil society initiatives in 
Sistan and Baluchistan are the Women for Equal Citizenship Campaign and the Women 
Presidents of Islamic Local Government and the Green Association of Women in Islamic 
Shura in cities and Khayr-u Sharr institutions in villages which enable women across 
castes to form stronger, coordinated pressure groups to highlight not only women‟s needs, 
but also the need for greater devolution of powers to the Islamic decentralised governance. 
238
 Civil society lobbying can further reinforce political will towards gender equity and 
prevent political parties from allowing partisan interests to reduce their gender 
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responsiveness.
239
 Such a broad strategy, involving the state, political parties and civil 
society groups, holds the best prospective for transforming governance in order to achieve 
gender equity in development. 
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                                                Concluding Remarks  
Iran has forged ahead with a bold experiment of social engineering through the legal 
affirmative action Facilitating Project for women and Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women in 
decentralised governance. The centrality of the political sphere in shaping gender power 
relations is recognised in the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women 1999 and the 
National women’s Charter 2000, which utilises the decentralised governance to execute the 
policy‟s gender-equalising social and economic reforms at the local level. A rights-based 
approach to engendering governance recognises the utility of affirmative action as a tool to 
ensuring women‟s formal representation in governance institutions. Affirmative action, 
however, cannot be the only tool to achieve women‟s rights to equal political participation 
and development. As this case study of Iran‟s Islamic decentralised governance institutions 
has shown, in the absence of enjoyment of social and economic rights, women and 
particularly Hazara Baluchs and Lakis women in governance encounter an array of 
personal, familial, social, economic and political hurdles to their access to equal 
participation in decision-making, Shuras‟ seats and empowered political participation in 
governance. This negates women‟s ability to produce gender-responsive policy outcomes.  
Empowering women to claim their right to equal political participation and to hold state 
and society actors accountable for promoting realisation of that right, therefore, requires a 
host of enabling policies and programmes that address the structural causes of women‟s 
socio-economic and political marginalisation. Substantive equality holds the key to 
empowering women, as individuals and as a collective, to reinvent political and social 
spaces in which to exercise choice, agency and voice over their development needs. This 
would build upon the successes of a number of women representatives in governance who 
have already seized the opportunity provided by affirmative action through the Facilitating 
Project in order to carve out political space for themselves and challenge gender-
inequitable local power structures. Moreover, by creating that critical mass of empowered 
women to transform governance and development, inclusive, democratic institutions and 
 66 
politics can lead to democratic practice at the broader societal level and social integration 
of marginalised groups such as women. 
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Annex (optional) 
Annex I: Table 1: Ethnic Groups in Iran 
 
Ethnic Groups  Language Religion 
Persian ( Persian- Speaking 
Groups) 
Persian ( Iranian) Islam( Shi‟a) 
Baluchs Baluchi (Iranian) Islam (Sunni) 
Lurs (Lors) Luri (Iranian) Islam (Shi„a) 
Gilakis Gilaki (Iranian) Islam (Shi„a) 
Mazandaranis Mazandarani (Iranian) Islam (Shi„a) 
Kurds Kurdish (Iranian) Islam (Sunni/Shi„a) 
Talishis Talishi (Iranian) Islam (Sunni/Shi„a) 
Gabrs (Zoroastrians) Gabri (Iranian) Zoroastrianism 
Laris Lari (Iranian) Islam (Sunni/Shi„a) 
Laks Laki (Iranian) Islam (Shi„a) 
Semnanis Semnani (Iranian) Islam (Shi„a) 
Gurans (Avromanis) Gurani (Avromani) (Iranian) Islam (Extreme shi„a) 
The Iranian-speaking groups 
in Isfahan and Kashan 
provinces 
Local Iranian dialects Islam (Shi„a) 
Koulis (Gypsys) Gypsy (Indo-Aryan)/ 
Persian 
Islam (Shi„a) 
Tats Tati (Iranian) Islam (Shi„a) 
Azaris Azari Turkish (Turkic) Islam (Shi„a) 
Brahuis Brahui (Dravidian) Islam (Sunni) 
Qashqais Turkic dialect Islam (Shi„a) 
Turkmens Turkmen (Turkic) Islam (Sunni) 
 B 
Other Turkic-speaking 
groups 
Turkic dialects Islam (Shi„a) 
Arabs Arabic (Semitic)/Persian Islam (Shi„a) 
Armenians Armenian (Indo-European) Christianity 
Kalimis (Jews) Persian Judaism 
Asuris (Assyrians) Assyrian (New Aramaic) 
(Semitic) 
Christianity 
Mandaeans Aramaic dialect/ Arabic 
(Semitic)/ 
Persian 
Mandaean religion 
Hazaras Persian Islam (Shi„a) 
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Annex II: The structure of the political system In Iran: 
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Annex III: Women in decision-making  
“Information document Prepared by the Islamic Republic Of Iran, Women’s 
Participation Centre, January 2004”  
 
Proportionate distribution of women candidates in the Islamic Parliament. 
Percentage of women parliamentary 
candidates. 
Percentage of women elected into the 
parliament 
1st Parliament: 3.02% 
2nd Parliament: 1.98% 
3rd Parliament :1.99% 
4th Parliament: 3% 
5th Parliament: 6.43% 
6th Parliament: 7.3% 
7th Parliament: 9.89% 
1.66 % 
1.66 % 
1.6 % 
3.6 % 
5.6 % 
4.4 % 
4.4 % 
 
 
Women representatives in City Councils 
Council 
Elections 
Number of 
Candidates 
Women 
Candidates 
1st 
Session 
164021 2.16 % 
elected 
2nd 
Session 
109587 2.68 % 
elected 
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Statistical table of managers, legislators and chief executives by sex disaggregation. 
 1994 2004 Growth rate 
 Male - Female Male - Female Male - Female 
Active gender 
composition 
88.94 % - 11.6 % 85.79 % - 14.21 % - 3.54 % - 28.48 % 
 
 
96.7 % - 3.3 % 95.65 % - 4.4 % - 0.14 % 33.33 % 
City Council 
Members 
 98.49 % - 1.51 %  
Manager, legislators 
and 
chief executives 
0.59 % - 0.16 % 2.1 % - 2.1 % 255.93 % 1212.50 % 
Technical and skilled 
workers 
8.87 % - 42.57 % 10 % - 29.9 % 17.31 % - 29.76 % 
Income equity 91 % - 0.9 % 89 % - 11 % - 2.20 % 22.22 % 
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 Members of parliament (%) Parliament Candidates (%) 
 Men  Women Men Women 
5
th
 Parliament 94.4 5.6 93.57 6.43 
6
th
 Parliament 95.6 4.4 92.7 7.3 
7
th
 parliament 95.6 4.4 90.11 9.89 
 
 
 
 Members of Cities and Villages of 
Islamic Councils 
Candidates for cities and villages 
Islamic Councils 
 Male % Female % Male % Female % 
First Run 162649 99.16 1373 0.84 328862 97.84 7276 2.16 
Second Run 152974 98.49 2338 1.51 213091 97.32 5866 2.68 
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Obstacles Of Women’s Political participations in Iran: 
1. Inadequate numbers of women present in political parties, resulting in a lesser number of 
women candidates. 
2. Lack of self-confidence in women in areas of power and decision-making. 
3. Weakness of gender perspective in national policies and programmes regarding women's 
Participation. The number of female managers in the governmental sector has increased 
with a growth rate of 63.33% in 1996 from 726 to 1,186 in 2000. In 1999 the number of 
women employees in government departments was 3,029, showing an increase of 5.2%in 
1997. Women occupied 4. % of vice managerial positions and 1/4 of managerial position in 
the executive department in 1999. The number of female managing directors of print media 
was 90 in 2000, showing an increase of 53% since 1997. 
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